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I Introduction 
 
This working paper provides the formal output1 from the first workpackage of the TRANSWEL 
research project (of a total of five workpackages). It presents the main results from 7 months of 
research work, which ran from February-September 2015. TRANSWEL is a transnational 
comparative study of regimes of social security portability in the European Union. The transnational 
element of the study has two aspects: the project investigates portability of social security in ‘the 
European Union’ (or ‘at EU level’), and between 4 transnational pairs of countries: Austria-Hungary, 
Germany-Bulgaria, Sweden-Estonia and UK-Poland. It compares social security portability for 
economically active mobile citizens in four policy areas: unemployment, family benefits, health and 
pensions.  
 
The knowledge goal of the first ‘workpackage’ of TRANSWEL, reported in this working paper, was to 
“analyse the legal regulations on portability of social security, including national and supra-national 
regulations” (Amelina 2014).  
 
This research phase of TRANSWEL was specifically focused on social security portability regulations 
(henceforth SSP regulation) but not in a descriptive manner. We had a particular interest in 
contributing to TRANSWEL’s aim of conceptualising, and identifying regimes of portability, and 
analysing the relationship of such regimes to experiences of inequality among EU migrants. 
Accordingly, the following questions were established to ‘operationalise’ the overall knowledge goal 
for the workpackage.  
 
• How is the portability of migrants’ social security rights between the sending and the 
receiving country2 in the EU structured in transnational and national regulations?  
• How do welfare systems’ conditionalities organize, condition, and set limits to the 
acquisition and portability of social security rights? 
 
This paper proceeds in eight main sections. Following this introduction, in section two, we discuss 
why portability matters and outline existing working definitions of SSP regulation in the literature. 
We problematize some of the assumptions of existing studies, outline a broader approach which 
addresses SSP regulation as matter of governance, and set out the key parameters of our empirical 
study.  
 
In section three, we explain some of the key legislative points of reference that shape portability in 
the EU. We outline the key Directives and Regulations, and set these in a summary map of EU 
portability regulation, and identify how these regulations formally position the social security rights 
of EU migrants.  
 
                                                 
1 One of the outputs was 5 policy briefs, summarizing the portability regulations in each of our four transnational cases 
and comparatively. The other output was a policy stakeholder seminar, convened in Brussels on 25 January 2016. The 
policy briefs and summary of the seminar are available at: www.transwel.org.  
2 The terminology ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ country is not ideal. Indeed studies like TRANSWEL demonstrate how this 
terminology presents analytical problems when transnational mobility, including temporary migrations and return, are 
important elements of a study (Amelina and Faist 2012). Where we want to explore experiences and practices of 
portability in the context of diverse mobilities between countries, rather than one-time migration, ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ 
is misleading terminology. We also would prefer not to privilege the ‘receiving countries’ in shaping portability 
experiences and practices (see Castles, 2016, Amelina et al 2015). Nonetheless, TRANSWEL is broadly framed in the policy 
and socio-economic context of mobility from specific EU8 member states to specific EU15 member states since 2004. We 
therefore refer to ‘EU8’ countries and EU15 countries, and sometimes reduce this, where it is analytically appropriate, to 
‘sending’ and ‘receiving’. 
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Section four outlines the complex, overlapping and mutually shaping contexts which within which 
portability regulation takes place, is understood and negotiated by policy actors as well as by 
migrants. We identify three significant contexts for analyzing EU citizens’ access to and portability 
of, social security. First, the broad historical context, which highlights the background to SSP 
regulation in the EU, and the importance of the timing of this research. Second, socio-political and 
institutional changes are explained, especially the political, economic and institutional implications 
of the 2004 and 2007 accessions along with the importance of welfare reforms in the EU of the last 
20 years. Third, the significance of increased diversity in benefits that are included in the EU’s SSP 
regulation, and the increased diversity of conditionality within welfare states is highlighted. The 
relevance of these contexts to our country-pair cases is also assessed.  
 
In section five, we briefly describe the research process of this phase of the TRANSWEL research 
project, on which our paper reports.  There is a separate methodological report to accompany this 
working paper, which provides more detail on the methods and the research process3. 
 
Section six, drawing directly on reports produced by teams in the TRANSWEL project, provides 
summaries of portability regulation, and their transnational contexts, within our four country pair 
cases, contributing to answering our first research question. The section concludes with a 
comparative overview of these findings.  
 
Section seven presents our empirical findings on the regulatory conditions that underpin how EU 
citizens’ access to, and portability of, benefits is governed, to address our second research question. 
We explore similarities and differences across our transnational cases in four policy areas. In we 
address the implications of these arrangements for the generation of logics of inclusion, exclusion 
and stratification for three different categories of migrant (one-time, returnee, and 
temporary/circular). 
 
Section eight draws together the different aspects of our findings to identify a new dynamic 
conceptualisation of portability regulation. By examining how these conditions vary by policy area in 
our transnational cases, we are able to identify sets of regulatory ‘gateways’ which set limit 
conditions to access and portability of social security for intra-EU migrants, which also vary by policy 
area and benefit type.  
 
The paper concludes in section nine with observations about the empirical findings of this part of 
the TRANSWEL study, and their significance for interpreting the transnational governance of SSP in 
the European Union, and some wider reflections on the conceptual implications of our findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Available from www.transwel.org. 
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II Portability regulation in social security4 
 
2.1 Existing studies of portability regulation 
 
Portability of social security (SSP) is nearly as old as social security itself. Historically it was the 
strategy adopted to organise the social security of mobile workers between nationally organised 
and occupationally stratified social security schemes. Once key groups of industrial workers (notably 
miners) became entitled to social protection, from the end of the nineteenth century, mechanisms 
to recognise these protections across borders were needed. This applied both to the entitlements 
of (usually) male, skilled workers recruited from other countries to support national strategies for 
industrialisation, and to the entitlements of similarly skilled industrial workers exported from 
European imperial states to colonial dependencies. As such, portability regulation was a response to 
the challenge that migration poses to the closure and exclusionary logic of national welfare states, 
with their assumptions of social citizenship as the demarcation of membership, obligation and rights 
(Marshall 1950, Lister 1998, Ferrera 2005). Thus, portability of social security was both embedded in 
specific national political economies of welfare and work, and also a mechanism for the 
organisation of social security beyond the national welfare state. It was organised as a cross-
national mechanism between closed national welfare systems. It was designed to secure and 
maintain the closure of social citizenship, and the privileges of particular groups of migrant workers, 
in the face of their mobility.  
 
For the purposes of this research, our focus on social security is the systems of cash benefits, 
funded through general taxation or social insurance contributions, and disbursed through the state 
as policy measures designed to protect individuals against social and economic burdens or distress 
(cf McKay and Rowlingson 2012). Social security was historically seen as protecting against labour 
market risks (being unemployed) and life course risks (being too old or too sick to work or not 
earning enough at particular phases of life, such as with children). However, feminist scholars have 
also shown that social security is also related to care risks, and indeed that all welfare systems rest 
on, and reproduce, presumptions about care and the gendered division of labour and gendered life 
course risks (Knijn and Kremer 1997, Lewis 2006, Bakker 2008:78-9). In addition, direct provision of 
social security for caring activities can both mitigate the social risks attached to the need for care, 
and also facilitate and support care provision. This can support care provision at home by 
individuals or through public provision (Jenson 1996, Leira and Saraceno 2002). Social security 
benefits provided in relation to care are often not tied directly to employment, although this varies 
by country and benefit type. 
 
By default, our analysis of SSP regulation is concerned with formal social security rights presented in 
public policy. This excludes an analysis of private mechanisms and informal strategies of social 
protection. Such strategies are examined in later workpackages of TRANSWEL, befitting their 
particular importance to transnational migrants (e.g. Bilecen and Barglowski 2015). However an 
interest in how SSP regulations generate conditions that limit the acquisition and portability of 
social security rights (our research question 2), also requires an analysis that interprets portability 
regulations in practice. This interest in the practice of SSP regulations is also reflected in the 
methodology of the workpackage, summarised in section five. Besides unemployment benefits and 
                                                 
4 In this text, we refer to social protection as a broader category of public policy provision than social security. TRANSWEL 
analyses the portability of social security. Social protection is all those policies – cash benefits and in-kind support, 
including housing, healthcare and social care, as well as employment protections in the labour market – which comprise 
measures to protect individuals from life course and social risks, and to prevent indigence. We use social security to refer 
to (pre-dominantly but not only) contributory-based cash benefits (some of which also are used to secure care and 
healthcare). When it comes to the detail of our empirical analysis, such a simple distinction breaks down, as we discuss in 
section four. In general however, it enables us to distinguish between a more inclusive definition of all social policies 
(social protection) to those which we examine here. 
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pensions, our study includes healthcare benefits and family benefits (including those for care 
provision) as fundamental aspects of social security provision, and ones that have particular 
implications for understanding gendered experiences of SSP. Including healthcare and family 
benefits also enables us to explore how SSP is regulated in cases with a more tenuous or a more 
complex relationship to employment status. 
 
There are a few definitions of portability of social rights from global studies of portability. These 
studies are dominated by research on pension portability, supplemented by interest in health 
insurance portability. Family benefits and unemployment are not addressed (see, e.g. Andrietti 
2001, Holzmann and Koettl 2014, Taha et al. 2015). According to Taha et al (2015: 98) portability is 
‘the ability of migrant workers to preserve, maintain, and transfer benefits from a social security 
programme from one country to another and between localities in a country (spatial portability), 
between jobs’. For Andrietti (2001: 60) portability is the capacity of individuals to ‘preserve the 
actuarially fair value of accrued rights while moving’ to a different employer, different schemes or 
countries.  Similarly, but more elaborately, portability is ‘the ability to preserve, maintain, and 
transfer vested social security rights (or rights in the process of being vested), independent of 
profession, nationality, and country of residency’ (Holzmann and Koettl 2014: 14) or ‘the possibility 
of acquiring and keeping social benefits’ entitlements and/or social rights in the event of mobility 
for work reasons’ (d'Addio and Cavalleri 2014: 1). Additionally some authors distinguish between 
cross-national ‘portability’ and ‘exportability’ of social security entitlements (Taha et al 2015), 
where portability refers to the ability to move earned entitlements between schemes, and 
‘exportability’ is the ability to move contributions to another scheme.  
 
In figure one below, we present these standard conceptualisations of cross-national SSP regulation 
as a linear process, which moves from a migrant contributing to a scheme, which generates 
entitlements to benefits. The entitlements can then either be accessed (the pension is claimed) or 
they can be ported to another scheme (in another country). For example, someone may make 
pension contributions in a scheme in country A where they currently work. When they move to 
country B, they can aggregate these earned entitlements with any later contributions from country 
B (to be accessed at a later date, in either country), or with existing contributions from periods of 
work in country B or even a third country. 
 
 
Figure 1. Standard conceptualisation of social security portability regulation as linear process 
 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
 
 
The portability of social security rights in the EU for EU citizens is highly regulated, in contrast to the 
portability of social security rights of non-EU nationals migrating into and within the EU. Avato et al 
 
contributions entitlement 
access &/or 
port 
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(2010: 458) categorise portability into four regimes, with intra-EU migrants classed within Regime I. 
This regime is defined as including ‘all legal migrants enjoying indiscriminate access to social 
services— in particular social security benefits—in their host country. In addition, home and host 
country have concluded a bilateral or multilateral social security arrangement guaranteeing that 
benefits are payable overseas (exportability of benefits), and also that the social security institutions 
of both countries jointly determine eligibility for and the level of the benefit’.  What is being 
described in this case is the formal legal status of EU workers’ access to social security rights in 
other member states of the EU. In their analytical schema, regime I is the most favourable regime 
for migrant workers in terms of formal social protection for migrants portability of their rights. 
However, access and portability is often marked by selective benefit provision linked to several 
factors such as: 
 
• Migration history. Portability of social rights is linked with professional trajectory and personal 
histories of migrations as they shape contributions and influence decision making, for example 
on early retirement (Jousten 2015) 
• Time and mobility.  Short term and long term stays imply very different relationships with 
formal social security regulation in the country of stay. Switching from one system to the other 
while migrating cannot take place without any financial losses. 
• Legal status. The EU citizenship or ‘‘citizenship of the Union’ is a highly stratified status built 
around an exclusive ideal of the citizen as a paid worker or, more precisely, a paid worker who 
is a national of an EU Member State’ (Dwyer and Papadimitriou 2006: 1307, Carmel and Paul 
2013). 
• Gendered socio-legal position and ties. The gendering of labour markets and occupations in 
countries of origin and destination, the gendered division of labour in families, and migration 
regulations on family status, all shape the need for, and access to social protection, and for 
social security more specifically (Lutz 2011, Kofman 2013, Lutz and Amelina 2016)  
• Sector and occupation Labour market conditions are one of the most important components of 
social protections for migrants. They are linked with the need for particular types of migrants 
and this need is apparent in the social entitlements provision. 
• Location The political economy of migration, between countries with often highly unequal 
earnings, standards and costs of living, means that the relative significance of earnings, 
remittances, and social security payments matters materially, as migrants move from one 
country to another, and one place to another within countries. 
 
In the light of such factors, the standard definition of portability of social benefits is problematic 
both conceptually and for migrants in practice. Misalignments can arise between formal legal 
requirements and the contextual conditions of migrants’ social protection. At the same time, these 
conditions can themselves be shaped by attempts to manage contrasting “domestically oriented 
social policy objectives and internationally oriented economic policy objectives’ (Holzmann and 
Koettl 2014: 34). Such contextual conditions may also be shaped by relations between receiving and 
sending countries, which can be highly politicized. 
- migrants who are in demand (e.g. highly skilled) may access social security rights more 
easily than others 
- low-paid migrant workers are less likely to access entitlements, especially if they are also in 
insecure employment or dependent self-employment5. 
 
                                                 
5 The distinction of dependent self--employment is where workers are formally (de jure) self-employed, but in all other 
respects undertake work in conditions which are the same as an employee. Self-employment usually grants access to 
fewer social and employment protections, and more costly social security than being an employee. Eurofound (2013) Self-
employed or not self-employed? Working conditions of ‘economically dependent workers’. Background paper    
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In sum, existing studies of SSP are global in geographical scope, but narrow in policy focus on 
pensions and health insurance. These studies acknowledge SSP regulation in practice may be 
complicated by the practices and experiences of migrants. However, this is not investigated in 
detail, notably in relation to questions of gender, ethnicity or age, for example. These studies also 
identify the key importance of contributory conditions for benefit eligibility in shaping social 
security portability for migrants (for the EU, see Moriarty et al. 2016).  
 
The studies have three key assumptions in common, which orient their investigations and our 
existing understandings of SSP regulation. First, that portability applies to social insurance-based 
benefits, through which entitlement to benefits are earned via contributions (which leads to 
‘vested’ rights). A second, reinforcing, assumption is that the migration itself is work-related.  
As we will see in section 3.1 below, and in contrast to these assumptions, European Union SSP 
regulation includes a number of non-contributory benefits. Migrants who are not workers (either in 
a sociological understanding of ‘worker’ or in the narrow EU legal definition of a ‘worker’) can 
access and port benefits. Third, national states are (often implicitly) conceptualised both as self-
contained repositories of policies, contributions and benefits, and as mutually exclusive territorial 
containers within which migrants reside. Our ‘transnational’ lens of analysis (Amelina and Faist 
2012) sensitises us to the methodologically nationalist assumptions in these studies. Both these 
assumptions are challenged in the case of the mobility of EU citizens (Favell 2008, Engbersen et al. 
2013, Scheibelhofer 2016: 77-82) 
 
Taken together, we can see that these three assumptions in existing studies are not tenable 
empirically, and that relations of employment, social security and migration need to be explicitly 
interrogated in any empirical analysis of SSP regulation.   
 
Access to social security in national welfare systems is of course conditional for all (Clasen and Clegg 
2007: 171-2) and (im)migrants’ relationship to such conditions is highly stratified by legal status and 
social categories of identify and inequality, such as ethnicity, class, gender, age and sexuality 
(Sainsbury 2006, Sainsbury 2012). Furthermore, transnational migrants’ mobile life trajectories 
weave together formal and informal strategies of social protection in complex ways, generating and 
re-working inequalities across local, national and transnational spaces (Faist 2014, Faist and Bilecen 
2015, Scheibelhofer 2016: 76). Consequently, portability of social security rights is especially 
important for migrants as they face more risks and hazards related to accessing social security than 
other social groups. In the context of migration, portability of social security rights is understood as 
involving the protection of migrants’ rights both spatially [while moving between two, or more 
countries] and temporally (securing rights over time).  
 
The mutually dependant but unequal political economy of migration is also directly linked to the 
political economy of welfare in the European Union (Slavnic 2007, Likic-Brboric 2011, Carmel 2014, 
Meeus 2016). Migration can be used as a form of social protection by migrants, and used by 
national policymakers to sustain the organisation of welfare states, while migrants adopt 
transnational informal social protection strategies, from remittances to flying grandmothers. 
Centering our analysis around such transnational perspectives problematises conventional 
understandings of ‘national’ welfare systems and regimes for understanding social security of 
migrants (Amelina et al. 2016b) including our interpretation of what constitutes SSP regulation. 
Social protection is produced in field of tension between the transnational and national, between 
migrant practices and regulatory conditions. This observation requires some conceptual attention to 
issues of ‘conditionality’, membership, inclusion and exclusion, and the production of inequalities in 
social security regulation. It also raises questions about how they might be analysed. It is these 
matters that we now turn. 
 
12 
 
2.2 Interpreting inclusion and exclusion: from portability regulation to transnational portability 
governance 
 
Social rights and entitlements act as barriers and entry points to social formations (“Austria”, 
“Bulgaria”, “Europe”). They selectively organize, valorise and exclude particular social groups, socio-
economic characteristics and behaviours. The regulations which determine these social rights and 
entitlements simultaneously both generate, and try to reproduce, the normative and cultural 
characteristics of the inside (the included, or us) by reference to the exclusion of the unwanted and 
undesirable. They privilege some social/economic/political groups, and create hierarchies of 
conditional belonging and insidership (e.g. Morris 2002, Anderson 2013, Carmel and Paul 2013). 
This is organized through the regulation of social rights and entitlements, which designate who has 
legitimate entitlement, that is, who is included in the organisation and distribution of welfare 
(Crowley 2001). In addition, the regulation of social rights and entitlements also establish specific, 
legitimized conditional gateways to entitlements, which articulate and privilege particular 
normative assumptions (e.g. about male breadwinners, mothers of young children, promotion of 
full-time employment). Thus in case of the EU, such regulations, give meaning to what it means to 
be ‘European’ as a citizen or state (Maas 2007) even if this meaning is in practice contingent and 
contested. 
 
In different contexts (e.g. different policy domains or different countries), the regulations creating 
such conditional gateways to formal membership or belonging may use a variety of mechanisms. 
The gateways are established through the mutual constitution of two dimensions of governance: 
the formal, or substantive dimension, in our case, goals of permitting or excluding the portability of 
social rights and entitlements; and the operational dimensions, which reflect how those goals are to 
be achieved (Carmel and Papadopoulos 2003). These dimensions are themselves underpinned and 
enabled by assumptions about inclusion and exclusion: selecting who meets which conditions, and 
how they are able to this to position and steer social subjects. 
 
Like conditionality of social security more generally, assumptions of inclusion, exclusion and 
stratification in SSP regulation have their origins in multiple and overlapping framings of the public 
good. Most obviously, these framings concern welfare (what and who it is for in general); political 
economy (what our society and economy should be like and how do ‘migrants’ ‘fit’); nationhood 
(where the borders of our society lie and how are they defined); gender norms and family (what are 
the mutual duties of support between family, state, society and individual). This means that SSP 
regulation contains and reproduces, rationales of inclusion, exclusion and hierarchical ordering 
(stratification). Indeed, conditionality in public social provision has always had this key normative 
role, both determining, and determined by, how and for whom welfare and social rights are 
provided (Clasen and Clegg 2007).  Such assumptions about, or rationales for, inclusion and 
exclusion are not necessarily coherent; indeed they are often in practice contradictory. Neither are 
they fixed, as they can be contested by the action of agents, especially by mobile people 
themselves, but also by other actors involved in regulation, such as bureaucratic decision-makers 
(Henman and Fenger 2006, Dwyer 2010, Wright 2016) or by jurisprudence and guidelines on 
implementation. It is in the mutual constitution of the two dimensions of governance, the formal 
and the operational, that the regulatory rationales for inclusion and exclusion are to be found. 
 
Therefore, ‘portability regulation’ is not only a mechanism which channels money and rights 
between nationally bounded, a priori closed welfare states, offering selective openness to particular 
migrants (cf Ferrera 2005 and the excellent empirical application in ), Blauberger and Heindlmaier 
(2016)). The conditions and practices of SSP regulation establish dynamic relations between 
mobility, residence, work and stratification that traverse two fields of tension: between EU-wide 
regulations, and the conditionality of national welfare states on the one hand, and between the 
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overall regulatory framework and migrants’ transnational practices, on the other. These dynamic 
relations generate possibilities for inclusion and exclusion that migrants might negotiate, resist, 
avoid, or simply ignore. However, such possibilities cannot be ‘read off’ from either the formal 
regulatory framework in the EU, or its transposition in national welfare states. To identify such 
possibilities requires an analysis that explores the transnational conditionalities embedded in SSP 
regulation, that is, the form and content of regulations shaped between the migration sending and 
receiving countries, as well as multilaterally across the EU as a whole.  
 
The interpretation of these dynamic relations and their implications for inclusion and exclusion also 
requires a ‘migrant’-centred analysis that is oriented to the attributes and experiences that mark 
migrants’ biographies and how these might intersect with both the formal regulatory framework, 
and practices ‘on the ground’. In doing so, it also requires ‘analytical contextualisation’ (Carmel 
1999, Carmel 2017 f/c) of the complex and intersecting circumstances within which such 
transnational conditionality of SSP regulation is practiced and with what implications. Our research 
questions demand a ‘migrant-centred’ analysis of the formal regulatory framework, the 
conditionality which is established in this framework and its implications for different (sociological) 
categories of migrant. This migrant-centred analysis is key to the design of the overall project design 
of TRANSWEL (Amelina 2014) and of this phase of research (section five below). 
 
Our investigation for the first phase of TRANSWEL had these research questions: How are migrants’ 
social security rights structured transnationally (in EU regulation, and between the migration 
sending and receiving countries) in regulations? How do welfare systems’ conditionalities organize, 
condition, and set limits to the acquisition and portability of social security rights?  Accordingly, the 
research was oriented around four aspects of inclusion/exclusion and hierarchical ordering which 
underpin SSP regulation transnationally.  
 
− who is ‘to be’ included 
− on what terms 
− how this is achieved  
− with what implications 
 
First, who is ‘to be’ included. We approached this aspect by reference to ‘categories of migrant’ a 
rather crude heuristic device to enable us to move away from ‘welfare system-centered’ analysis of 
SSP regulation to one focused on migrants. Our findings give us a first reference point for 
understanding the regulatory conditions that diverse mobile citizens must negotiate, or try to avoid, 
in organizing their welfare/social provision transnationally.  
 
Second, the terms on which mobile EU migrants are ‘to be’ included in the transnational EU domain 
and country-pair cases. In this aspect of our analysis, we want to look more closely at how different 
types of SSP regulation shape the formal limits and constraints of social rights portability. At the EU 
level, there are a number of ways in which cross-cutting legal framings and regulations might affect 
portability of social rights for different EU citizens. In section three of this working paper, we map 
both the formal goals of the different types of portability regulation and the sets of rights which 
these legally accord EU national migrants. In section four, we explain the ways in which this formal 
or legal attribution of rights gains is contingent on the diversities of welfare state provision in the EU 
and may generate diverse and unequal effects in practice.  
 
Third, how are possibilities for inclusion and exclusion created – across cases and policy areas. We  
can identify the type of regulation or mechanisms through which dynamic relations between 
mobility, residence, work and stratification are established. For example, is it achieved through 
direct and specific regulations; or by complex or difficult procedural requirements. The second 
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aspect exploring how such dynamic relations take effect in SSP regulation is to investigate the ways 
in which they are produced by that field of tension between EU-wide regulations and those 
transnational regulations established between pairs of countries, and those national regulations, of 
the individual countries. This is addressed in section six of this paper and in section seven we 
explore variations by policy domain. This empirical analysis enables us to identify a more complex 
and dynamic conceptualization of SSP regulation, explained in section eight. 
 
Fourth: with what implications for inclusion and exclusion are such relations of mobility, residence, 
work and stratification established? An analysis of the full implications of the regulatory conditions 
of portability is outside the scope of the research presented in this paper. It requires an exploration 
of whether such regulatory pathways matter at all for individual migrants’ practices and 
experiences, and if so how. Among other aspects, later parts of the TRANSWEL project will enable 
us to explore these. Nonetheless, we impute the assumptions about, and possibilities for, inclusion, 
exclusion and stratification inscribed in the dynamics of SSP regulation in our transnational cases. In 
this paper, we do this by reference to: the differential and unequal entitlements secured by 
different categories of migrant; the socio-political context in which the regulations are produced; 
and diversity across policy areas. At its heart, this analysis concerned with the rationales that 
underpin the regulations, especially the conditions that govern and hierarchically order access to 
social rights for different mobile people in different countries of the EU.  
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III The formal framework of portability regulation in the EU6  
 
In this section of the working paper, we provide an overview of key aspects of the formal EU 
regulatory framework affecting SSP in the Union.  
 
3.1 EU legal regulation 
 
It presents both the main legislation, their purposes and main points, as well as significant relevant 
case law. In doing so, the overview also draws attention to the areas of contention, ambiguity and 
complexity in the regulations. It is organised as follows: 
 
• Primary EU law (Treaty-based provisions)  
• Secondary legislation (law developed from Treaty provisions) 
- Directives (in-principle, legal specifications of minimum requirements, to be transposed 
into national legislation)  & key associated case law 
- Regulations (highly specified legal requirements, which must incorporated into national 
legislation) & key associated case law 
• Additional relevant case law 
 
3.1.1 Treaty-based provisions  
 
Free movement 
 
- Article 21 ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties 
and by the measures adopted to give them effect.’ 
- Articles 21(1) and (3) allow “the legislature to set the conditions for movement and residence and 
measures of social protection which secure this end.” (Chalmers, 2014). 
- Article 20(2) the right to free movement and residence for EU citizens can be restricted by 
secondary legislation 
 
Chalmers, (2014:6) maintains that the Treaties are especially circumspect when it comes to the 
articles on citizenship. In particular, he maintains that “…unlike other Treaty principles, the right of 
EU citizens to come and reside within another Member State does not constrain EU legislation but is 
rather subject to the limits and conditions set down by such legislation.”  
 
Non-discrimination 
 
- Article 45(2) prohibits discrimination against workers from other member states in ‘employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.’ 
- Article 18 prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality, but there are strong limitations to this 
prohibition. 
  
                                                 
6 This section is set out primarily as a descriptive list of key regulations, and the key case law which have qualified or 
elaborated on their implementation. We have included those which especially seem relevant to our cases and are 
reflected in our comparative data.  
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3.1.2 Directives 
 
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family member to reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. OJ 2004, L158/77. 
 
Key message: EU citizens who are employed, self-employed, self-sufficient or who are a family 
member of an EU citizen who is, are entitled to equal treatment to nationals. 
 
Article 7(1)(a) – Residence above 3 months is available to all EU citizen workers or self-employed in 
a second member state 
Article 7(1)(b) - Residence above 3 months is available to all citizens (economically active and 
inactive EU citizens and their family members) who can show they are not an ‘unreasonable burden’ 
on the social assistance system of MS of residence, and that they have comprehensive health 
insurance. 
 
Article 7(3)(c) – even a brief working period, including on short contracts (less than 12 months), if 
followed by unemployment, should enable an EU worker7, if they are registered unemployed, to 
have a right of residence no less than six months.  
Article 24(2) - Social assistance does not have to be provided to workers in first 3 months.  
 
Case of Brey, C-140/12, judgement September 2013: that imposition of a period of residence by 
member state before an EU citizen acquires rights to benefit is not unlawful discriminatory 
treatment. However, social assistance should be paid to workers after the first 3 months where it 
does not present an unreasonable burden on the state (duration of residence, personal 
circumstances, the amount of money and temporary nature of difficulties can be taken into 
account). This is partly contradicted by the case of Alimanovic, C-67/14, judgement, September 
2015. This judgement considered that the right of equal treatment under the Citizen’s Directive is 
subordinate to ‘lawful residence’, a status which may depend on not having recourse to public 
funds (ie social assistance): one can, following this judgement, have a right of residence in another 
member state without access to minimum social benefits in that state. 
 
Case C-46/12: that if your work does not pay you enough to live on, as an EU citizen you must also 
receive social assistance. This creates the ironic situation for EU citizen migrants, that if you are not 
a worker, you must be economically self-sufficient, but there is no such requirement if you are a 
worker.  
 
The interaction of Directive 2004/38, with Treaty rights to non-discrimination with nationals, and 
with Regulation 883/2004 on social security co-ordination (below) continues to cause difficulties 
and referrals to the CJEU. The issue raises contention among member states about the right to 
reside: if an inactive person (a pensioner say) does not have comprehensive sickness insurance (as 
per 2004/38), do they qualify for residence because, through the Regulation, they can access 
healthcare and social security? Legally speaking, it is a question of which legislation takes priority 
between the regulation and the Directive (see Jorens et al. 2013, O'Brien et al. 2014).  These cases 
matter for the study of portability, because they directly affect  
 
a) what legal protections a mobile person might be able to invoke to secure their social rights while 
residing in another member state, and  
b) what that person might have to provide or show to a decision-maker in order to prove their right 
of residence and entitlements.  
                                                 
7 See below, 3.1.4 and especially 3.2, for discussion of how definitions of ‘worker’ and ‘work’ matter in law and policy 
across the Union. 
17 
 
Of these, for our empirical analysis, with its emphasis on the migrant-centred perspective, b) is most 
important, although not specified in EU regulation. 
 
Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare 
 
Key message Enables patients to secure treatment in another MS and have that treatment 
reimbursed by their home MS.  Full implementation of this Directive was only required by end of 
2014. 
 
MS are required to establish lists of treatments which require prior authorisation, and those which 
do not. The former would normally be more significant treatments, involving overnight stays in 
hospital. MS are also required to establish ‘National Contact Points’ for citizens to find information 
on conditions, limits and possibilities of seeking medical treatment abroad. This directive is 
potentially significant for mobile EU citizens: especially those who move between countries more 
frequently, and those who might prefer to seek medical treatment in their country of origin. 
 
However, recent evaluations (Pennings 2011, Jorens et al. 2013: 30 , Commission of the European 
Communities 2015) point to significant areas of overlap and confusion in the application of 
883/2004 on sickness and health insurance, and the rights established through 2011/24/EU. The 
Commission’s evaluation report notes that there is minimal awareness among the general 
population, confusion among decision-makers, and lack of legal clarify regarding the respective 
application of the Directive and 883/2004. 
 
3.1.3 Regulations 
 
Regulation 883/2004 on the Co-ordination of Social security systems  
Regulation 987/2009, Implementing regulation 883/2004 
 
Key message: these Regulations, with their annexes, form the centre-point of governance of social 
rights portability in the EU. Of central importance is the emphasis on ‘co-ordination’, rather than 
‘harmonisation’. The development of policies for social protection remains a competence of 
member states of the Union, rather than of the Union as a whole. Thus, these Regulations set out 
procedures and rules for how the institutionally, legally and politically independent social security 
regulations of member states should be co-ordinated, to prevent barriers to free movement 
(Employment Social Policy Health and Consumer Affairs Council 2003, Regulation 883/2004, 
preamble (32)) and while “contributing towards improving [EU workers’] standard of living and 
conditions of employment” (Regulation 883/2004, preamble (1)). This means that 883/2004 
establishes a specific set of conditions and rights whereby a) contributions or other qualifications 
for social security earned in one member can be recognised in another, and b) responsibility for 
payment of benefits is assigned between member state welfare systems.  
 
However, an ambivalent relationship with residence was directly established within the Regulation. 
‘Residence’ is defined according to EU law, as “the place where a person habitually resides” 
(Regulation 883/2004, Art. 1(j)). The Regulation establishes a general principle that benefits shall 
not be reduced, or adjusted “on account of the fact” that a social security beneficiary or their family 
members reside in another member state (Art. 7). Thus the place of residence should not define the 
ability of social security beneficiaries to access their entitlements (ie wherever they live), although 
this is subject to very specific time limits in the case of unemployment benefits (Art. 63).  
 
Consequently a contradictory position is embedded in the Regulation. On the one hand, EU citizens’ 
social security rights are not to be dependent on residence within a specific member state. Yet at 
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the same time, social security itself is conceptualised as fully ‘bounded’ in the specific national 
welfare systems of member states, with their embedded rules and norms. The Regulations require 
the determination of the – single - ‘competent’ member state; this in turn, requires the 
determination of “(habitual) residence” in only one member state (see especially 987/2009, Art. 
11). This ambivalence between fully deterritorialised (or Europeanised) social security rights, and 
national member state ‘belonging’ through habitual residence, is explicitly expressed in the 
preamble to the Regulation, which goes further even than habitual residence, noting the existence 
of ‘special benefits’ which are too nationally-embedded to be portable:  
 
“Within the Community there is in principle no justification for making social security rights 
dependent on the place of residence of the person concerned; nevertheless in specific 
cases, in particular as regards special benefits linked to the economic and social context of 
the person involved, the place of residence could be taken into account”  
(Regulation 883/2004, preamble (16)).  
 
In addition, for mobile EU citizens and workers, these conditions and rights are contingent on the 
relationship with a number of other elements of the formal legislative framework. As a result, these 
Regulations are situated at the centre of a matrix or web of Directives, Regulations and case law 
based on a highly problematic underlying political and legal structure. As de Witte (2013: 593) 
argues, the process of EU integration “deliberately insulated the free movement provisions from 
political interference by their transnational codification, while the social question remained on the 
national level.”  
 
The complexity of these interacting EU regulations and Directives is recognised as a problem in 
numerous analyses (Blauberger and Schmidt 2014, Pennings 2014, Moriarty et al. 2016) but the 
focus in these studies is generally on the formal legal or regulatory complexity (but see Blauberger 
and Heindlmaier 2016), rather than the implications for practice and migrants’ experiences. 
 
The Dano case, C-133/13, judgement in November 2014, found that for economically ‘inactive’ EU 
citizens residing in second member state, restrictions on their access to social assistance in the 2004 
Citizen’s Directive should be prioritised over any less restrictive view of entitlement in the 883/2004 
regulation on portability of social security.  
 
Regulation 492/11 on the free movement of workers  
 
Key message: This regulation establishes that a worker, self-employed person and self-sufficient 
person are granted rights of residence for more than three months in another MS. Anyone not in 
these categories can be refused right of residence. (Alokpa, EU: C: 2013: 645, para 31) 
 
Those covered by the Regulation ‘shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national 
workers’ (art 7(2)); are granted access to housing benefits (art 9) and education for their children on 
the same terms as nationals (art 10). Child benefit is considered to be covered by art 7(2) (Non-
payment to children abroad can constitute indirect discrimination as non-nationals are more likely 
to have children who reside abroad.) 
 
The concept of the ‘employed’ also covers unemployed EU migrants, given a ‘reasonable’ time to 
find work (called ‘retained worker’). Six months is reasonable (Antonissen C-2092/89), especially if 
the previous employment in the current member state was for less than one year (Alimanovic C-
67/14). They may be able stay for longer, but the onus should be on the individual to prove that 
they have a ‘genuine chance of being engaged’. If previously employed in the member state for 
longer than 12 months, restrictions on length of stay (and thus rights to equal treatment in social 
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benefits) are generally not considered permissible. Other case law also provides that workers who 
become unemployed while on maternity or parental leave will keep their ‘retained worker’ status 
until after the end of their maternity/parental leave. 
 
3.1.4 Key case law definitions 
 
On the definition of residence: 
The definition of residence as the place where a person ‘habitually resides’ is dependent on a 
definition of ‘habitual residence’ which applies across all EU law (thus including, but not confined to, 
Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009). Habitual residence was defined by the CJEU as “the State in 
which the persons concerned habitually reside and where the habitual centre of their interests is to 
be found…..account should be taken in particular of the employed person's family situation; the 
reasons which have led him [sic] to move; the length and continuity of his residence; the fact 
(where this is the case) that he is in stable employment; and his intention as it appears from all the 
circumstances” (Case Swaddling [1999] ECR I-1075, paragraph 29, C-90/97). 
 
The criteria for establishing habitual residence are general, and not complete: they “may include” 
(Regulation 987/2009, Art. 11):  
 
• family situation (family status and family ties); 
• duration and continuity of presence in the Member State concerned; 
• employment situation (nature and specific characteristics of any activity pursued, in particular 
the place where such activity is habitually pursued, the stability of the activity, and the duration 
of the work contract); 
• exercise of a non-remunerated activity; 
• in the case of students, the source of their income; 
• housing situation, in particular how permanent it is; 
• the Member State in which the person is deemed to reside for taxation purposes; 
• reasons for the move; 
• the intention as it appears from all the circumstances . 
 
The criteria are not hierarchically related, but some criteria may be considered more important than 
others, depending on the beneficiaries’ personal circumstances. Furthermore, national criteria of 
residence can be applied to the determination of which member state is responsible for a benefit, 
as long as these criteria do not fall foul of the non-discrimination requirements of the Treaty and 
the Citizens’ Directive (see 3.1.1 above) (Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social 
Security Systems 2013: 44-5).  
 
On the definition of work:  
The definition of what counts as ‘work’ is important because proving this status as a worker is vital 
as it grants access to rights of residence, access to benefits and portability as a ‘free moving 
worker’. Furthermore, having employment is also used in Habitual Residency tests to ascertain the 
‘centre of life’ of migrants.  
 
The question of what counts as work (and therefore who counts as a worker) has been left to MS, 
but CJEU case law shows that it can be rather minimal – a few hours work per week, and financially 
not necessarily enough to live on (or to enable someone to live without recourse to social 
assistance). The legal definition of work for the purposes of assessing whether an EU citizen is ‘in 
work’ and therefore a worker, is whether the work is more than ‘marginal and ancillary’ (Case Genc 
v Land Berlin, C-14/09). However, as we will see in section 3.2, below, a number of member states 
have been adjusting their national definitions of ‘work’ as they apply to criteria for benefit 
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entitlement. Table 1 below (p.21) maps the key relevant legislation and rulings which affect 
portability and the access of mobile citizens’ access to social rights.  This map is a heuristic overview 
of the ways in which the regulatory framework agreed at the level of the EU impact on different 
types of benefit examined in our study. It is not intended to act as a source for all legal cases that 
might raise questions of social security and free movement.  
 
Overall, this rather cursory overview indicates that the presentation of principles of free movement 
of workers, and of social security co-ordination in EU regulations is not. We are left with a bundle of 
laws and regulations, but without a clear sense of what this might mean for migrants themselves as 
they face different circumstances. Understanding what the regulations mean for migrants is central 
to the analysis of the dynamic relations between mobility, residence, work and stratification, and 
the next sub-section summarises the formal positioning of EU national migrants by these legal 
provisions, before the paper examines how these principles unfold in relation to national provision 
of different benefits and the interpretation of these in practice. 
 
3.2 EU migrants’ formal rights to social security and portability  
 
The first clarification to make is that our analysis is organised around the general regulation of rights 
to SSP for intra-EU ‘economically active’ migrants (excepting ‘posted workers’ and some other 
categories cited below). However, there are particular categories of intra-EU migrant such as 
‘economically inactive’ migrants (students, pensioners), who are also subject to other rights and 
regulations. This working paper does not examine regulations for these categories of migrant except 
those that also apply to the economically active according to their more general legal status as EU 
nationals . Legal categories excluded from our analysis include: 
 
a) Sole-trader, who has their own business based in one country, but does business offering 
services in another: here the migrant is a service provider who moves under the right to provide 
services, rather than the right to free movement. To be considered a migrant, the person must 
live a number of days per month in the second country. 
b) Migrant working for an employer who is sent to another country to undertake a specific work-
task or job, which their employer has been contracted for: here the migrant is a posted worker, 
and subject to Regulations on posted workers. 
c) Migrant who lives in one country and is employed in another: here the migrant is a ‘cross-
border worker’. There are no specific Regulations or Directives affecting EU cross-border 
workers, and they are considered as EU workers, but Regulation 883/2004 gives specific 
consideration to their situation in a number of its articles. There is CJEU jurisprudence which 
regulates the tax position of cross-border workers. 
 
Finally, there is also the important distinction within national social security regulations, between 
categories of employee. As we are concerned with general SSP regulations, rather than distinctions 
between occupational groups (which might have different pension schemes, for example), the most 
salient distinctions are between the formally employed, informally employed and self-employed. 
The distinction between the formally and informally employed is at the heart of the TRANSWEL 
project, and is highly relevant for later work. Taking account of employment status (who counts as a 
worker) and contributions from employment (do all workers make contributions) in interpreting the 
implications of SSP regulations is a significant part of our analysis. We excluded the self-employed 
from our analysis. In all our country cases, the self-employed are subject to special regulations 
regarding social security contributions – and tax. While in general we expect there to be higher 
proportions of self-employed among migrants, for the regulatory analysis this would have in effect 
doubled the range of the empirical analysis.  
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Table 1: Key relevant sources of legal regulation in the European Union affecting portability and access to social rights for mobile EU citizens8,9
                                                 
8 Own compilation from EU documentation, with reference to Shaw et al, 2014; Chalmers, 2014. SNC-CB means Special non-contributory cash benefit in Reg 883/2004. 
9 Italics indicates that this item may not apply without exception to all mobile citizens claiming or seeking to claim, a particular benefit.  ALL EU mobile citizens staying or residing in another 
EU member state are subject to Art. 21 of the Treaty, on Free Movement. For that reason, this important article is not referred to here. 
Benefit type Treaty articles Directives Regulations ECJ cases 
Unemployment  
Unemployment insurance - 18 (non-discrim by nationality) 
- 45(2) (non-discrim of workers) 
- 2004/38 (rights of residence and equal  
treatment of workers and dependants) 
- 883/2004 & 987/2009 (SSco) 
- 492/11 (FM of workers) 
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09 (definition of work);  
Antonissen C-2092/89 (time to seek employment) 
Unemployment assistance - 18 
- 45(2)  
- 2004/38 (workers, if scheme is social  
insurance; Articles. 7(1)(b), 7(3)(c), 24(2)  
on access if scheme is social assistance) 
- 883/2004  & 987/2009 (contributory &  
statutory schemes, or if SNC-CB) 
- 492/11  
Brey, C-140/12 (where UA is social assistance); Genc v  
Land Berlin, C-14/09 (definition of work);  Antonissen C-
 (time to seek employment);  Case C-46/12: (right to  
support for income if wages too low; relevant for SA  
schemes); Dano C-133/13; Alimanovic C-67/14 
Family 
Maternity 
paternity 
18 
- 45(2) (contributory schemes) 
- 2004/38 - 883/2004 & 987/2009  
- 492/11  
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09;  
Parental leave - 18,  
- 45(2) 
- 2004/38 - 883/2004 & 987/2009  
- 492/11  
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09 
Child-raising allowance - 18 - 2004/38 - 492/11, art. 7(2) (workers & dependants Hartmann, C-12/05 
Child benefit - 18 - 2004/38 - 492/11, art 7(2) (workers & dependants  
Health 
Sickness insurance - 18 
- 45(2)  
- 2004/38 - 883/2004 & 987/2009 
-492/11  
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09 
Health insurance and  
healthcare cover 
- 18 
- 45(2) (for workers) 
- EHIC 
- 2004/38, art. 7(1)(b) (requiring cover for  
resident non-workers) 
- 2011/24/EU 
- 883/2004 & 987/2009 (for workers) 
-492/11 (for workers) 
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09 (for workers);  Alokpa, EU: C:  
2013: 645 (limit on rights of residence if not self- 
sufficient or worker) 
Pensions 
Basic (1st pillar  
pension) 
18, 45(2)  - 2004/38 - 883/2004 & 987/2009 (contributory 
 
Genc v Land Berlin, C-14/09  (contributory schemes) 
2nd pillar public pension 45(2) - 2004/38 - 883/2004 & 987/2009 (statutory 
schemes)  
- 492/11 
 
  
 
So what do these free movement and social security rights formally regulate? 
 
Moving to another member state 
An EU national who moves to another EU country to live is exercising their rights to move to, and 
reside in, that second country as an EU citizen. EU citizens who have been living in another member 
state for less than five years must be “self-sufficient” and have comprehensive health insurance. For 
the first five years, they may not be “an unreasonable burden” on the welfare system of their 
country of residence. What counts as an unreasonable burden is defined by each individual country, 
but usually limits the extent to which EU citizens have “recourse to public funds”.  
 
This means that incoming EU citizens do not have a right to receive social support in their new 
country of residence on the grounds of financial need. As a result, social assistance benefits are not 
automatically accessible to all EU citizens until they have been in the country for five years. In 
practice, though, the entitlements for EU citizens hinges on their employment status and under 
certain conditions. 
 
Working in another member state 
A migrant who moves to another EU country and takes up “genuine and effective” employment is 
considered to be a worker. Workers, who can either be employed or self-employed, are formally 
entitled to move and live in another EU member state without restriction. They are also entitled to 
equal treatment with nationals in employment and access to social benefits after the first three 
months. As long as the EU worker has worked at least one day in the country of destination, they can 
export any social insurance contributions (public pension, statutory health insurance, 
unemployment insurance) they have made in their previous country/countries of residence to be 
added to any contributions to social security they make in their country of destination. In the case of 
pensions, if the contributions are for less than 12 months in any member state, these contributions 
are treated as if they were made in the country where most pension contributions were made. Most 
importantly however, is that the key to these rights is what counts as “genuine and effective work” is 
defined by member states, and a number of member states have introduced domestic legislation to 
tighten its definition (O'Brien et al. 2016). This has the result of stratifying the relations of mobility, 
work and residence by class, as well as by gender, due to occupational segregation and inequalities 
in the labour market (O'Brien 2013: 1646, 2016). (See section 4 below.) 
 
Losing a job in that member state 
If a migrant who moves to another member state is employed for a while and then becomes 
unemployed, they are either classified as a “jobseeker” or as a “retained worker”. A retained worker 
must have been employed for at least six months in genuine and effective work. They keep the legal 
status of worker and are entitled to the same social security and residence rights as nationals, under 
the non-discrimination requirements of the Treaty and Citizenship Directive 2004/38. Member 
states establish different lengths of time when a person can keep this intermediary status. After the 
six month period, a retained worker must have a “genuine chance of being engaged” to keep that 
status. If the worker was previously employed for more than 12 months, jurisprudence suggests that 
the status of ‘retained worker’ can be kept indefinitely.  
 
Looking for work in another member state 
Legally, there are two kinds of “jobseeker”. First, someone who has been employed, but for less than 
six months, or in work which is not considered “genuine and effective”. And second, a migrant who 
moves to another EU country to look for a job: they have a right to stay and look for work for six 
months. If such job-seekers have registered unemployed for at least four weeks before seeking 
employment in another member state, they can also choose to export any benefit from their former 
state of residence, to be paid by the country of destination (and reimbursed by the country of 
origin). The economic value of the benefit and standard of living in each country can radically affect 
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the monetary value of this portability right (e.g. Estonian unemployment benefit is of very low value 
relative to costs of living in Sweden). 
 
After the first three months of living in a country, EU migrants classified as “jobseekers” have some 
entitlement to those benefits that are designed to support the search for employment (usually 
unemployment assistance benefit) in the country of destination. They do not have a right to general 
social assistance. Case law and the right of residence under Directive 2004/38 cited in section 3.1 
above means that their access to such benefits can be limited to three months. To access such 
benefits, “jobseekers” must also show a close link with the domestic labour market, and be 
‘habitually resident’, with their ‘centre of life’ in the country of destination. 
 
Route to permanent residency in another member state 
An EU citizen who lives in a second member state for five years or more, with no absences for longer 
than three months, is a permanent resident. This status applies automatically and there is no 
requirement to apply to be a permanent resident. It confers special protections against deportation 
and generates rights to have “recourse to public funds”, irrespective of employment status. If an EU 
citizen is self-sufficient and meets national residency requirements, there are no formal limits on 
how long they can live in another member state. But it is possible to lose this right to reside, notably, 
if the migrant is “an unreasonable burden” on the host state. If an EU citizen loses this right to 
reside, they can be deported; although the criteria for deportation are high – such as very high 
threats to public health or the public good – and difficult to enforce. 
 
3.3 Summary 
EU law and regulations that affect social security portability for intra-EU migrants are complex, have 
overlapping definitions, and terms which can be difficult to interpret. Most importantly, they contain 
within them contradictory principles of mobility (social security rights should follow the individual) 
and sedentarism (the individual must ‘belong’ to one member state, by employment or residence). 
Variation in the significance of regulations will depend on changes in jurisprudence, the policy area 
(unemployment, family benefits, pensions, healthcare and pensions), type of benefit (contributory, 
non-contributory), specific member state regulations and their interaction between countries of 
migration and return, as well as the circumstances and life history of the migrant. To investigate the 
implications of SSP regulations and conditions in practice, we need to examine in more detail the 
transnational political, institutional and socio-economic contexts within which these regulations are 
applied. These issues are addressed in section four. 
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IV Complex empirical contexts of EU portability governance 
 
4.1 Historical context and the EU framework 
 
The complexity of the EU framework is not merely produced by its definitions or legal contradictions. 
It is also produced by its implicit assumptions – political, ideological and historical. The assumption in 
the existing literature is that portability regulations apply to standard, contributions-based social 
insurance schemes (such as pensions), and to worker-migrants. These assumptions – about work, 
the EU-worker citizen, and about social protection – are embedded in the origins of EU social 
security co-ordination regulations and have also affected adjustments and amendments to 
regulations since then. This sub-section attends to the historicity of SSP regulation and its 
importance for interpreting its implications. 
 
The Social Security Co-ordination Regulations were first established at the zenith of ‘Fordist’ 
production models of manufacturing and industry in several of the (only) six member states in 
Regulation 1408/71. These six member states were marked by Bismarckian or ‘conservative-
corporatist’ welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, Bonoli 1997) and an emphasis on supporting 
the male breadwinner, common to most postwar Western European welfare states (Lewis 1992) and 
securing standards of living across the life-course with some, relatively limited, re-distribution 
among income groups. Regulation 1408/71 was originally designed to protect male industrial 
migrant workers, in full-time, skilled, regular employment. It would secure their social rights 
especially in pensions and health-care, in the aftermath of expansionary reforms to pension systems, 
as these workers moved from one ‘Bismarckian’ or ‘conservative-corporatist’ welfare state to 
another, at broadly similar levels of income. This description highlights the historical specificity of 
the context within which the original social security co-ordination Regulation was adopted and alerts 
us to the radical transformation of the social and economic context of social security provision which 
apply in contemporary member states.  
 
Questions of coherence between member state social security regulations and the terms of 
1408/71, not to mention the unwieldly weight of numerous reforms to 1408/71 over the years, lead 
to attempts to develop a new Regulation. Eventually 883/2004, and its implementing Regulation 
987/2009 were agreed, including in their aims, the accommodation of maternity and parental leave 
and to regulate some special non-contributory benefits in an expansionary vision of modernizing 
legislation in accordance with the emergence of EU citizenship as a fundamental legal status. This 
latter status was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, and specified in Directive 2004/38, the so-
called Citizen’s Directive. The new Regulation and the Directive were introduced at the same time, 
building on a wave of optimism from the late 1990s about the future of the Union and its role in 
generating social rights (Daly 2012, Carmel and Papadopoulos 2016).  
 
However, as we saw above, the applicable legislation is both complicated and overlapping. CJEU 
rulings, based on individual cases, can have results that are difficult to interpret in national systems. 
O'Brien (2013: 1643) argues that the result is that “rights do not attach to personhood; rather rights 
are triggered, interpreted, delineated and weighed according to a miscellany of conditions”. This 
miscellany creates gaps which accommodate narrow and economistic constraints on the legal 
specification of EU citizenship and in which member states can (re)nationalize the legal category of 
EU citizen to suit their political preferences and contexts (Shaw 2015). The ‘in principle’ 
characteristic of Directives, combined with specificity of portability regulation compounds the 
complexity of portability governance for EU citizens and workers. Even if clearly designated the 
‘competent’ MS, countries may set additional requirements around residency or attachment to the 
labour market. These conditions may derive either from other EU legislation (eg 6 month limits on 
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job search from Directive 2004/38 and case law) or from national interpretations of these (affecting 
‘right to reside’) or from national conditions which apply to particular benefits. The preference for 
“political truth” and the demands of member state politics favoured by member states, rather than 
EU-wide jurisprudential coherence (Shaw 2015) has also affected CJEU jurisprudence over time, 
from an earlier expansionary to a latterly more restrictive view on EU migrants’ rights 
(Kostakopoulou 2001, O'Brien 2016).  EU jurisprudence on SSP regulation is thus dynamic and 
contingent. Insofar as it acts as a ‘framework’ for how member states regulate access and portability 
to social security, it does so on shifting terrain rather than on solid foundations. 
 
We should consider the date of these key pieces of secondary legislation as analytically relevant. 
They were agreed only a few years after the introduction of European Monetary Union, before the 
momentous 2004 accessions, and have also witnessed significant welfare state and labour market 
reforms in many member states even before the 2008 financial crisis. In order to investigate how the 
portability of migrants’ social security rights are structured transnationally, between the migration 
sending and receiving counties, and to explore how regulatory conditions organize, condition, and 
set limits to the acquisition and portability of social security rights, we should attend to these 
contexts in more detail. 
 
4.2 Changing institutional and socio-political contexts 
 
4.2.1 Political economy of accessions 
Notwithstanding the adjustments in CJEU jurisprudence, the 2004 Regulations and Directives 
necessarily also carry with them traces of earlier assumptions about what welfare states are and do, 
and for whom they do it. A key context for interpreting this is the institutional effects of 2004 and 
2007 accessions on both policymaking and applicability of regulations, directly introducing 
significantly more diversity and complexity to the regulation of SSP. 
 
In particular, they carry with them assumptions about the political economy of welfare and of labour 
markets in the EU, notably, a broad socio-economic equality among member states. This might have 
been plausible among the six member states that originally developed social security co-ordination; 
less so following the Southern (1980s) and Northern (1990s) accessions. They certainly cannot be 
said to hold true since 2004 (Menz 2009, Carmel 2014). Such inequalities have been shaken up, but 
not ameliorated, since 2008 – rather the reverse. These inequalities were partially managed by 
efforts to exclude EU8 migrants from free movement and its attendant rights, for up to 9 years after 
accession.10 Directly shaped by the unprecedented inequalities in GDP per capita and living 
standards between the EU8 and EU15 (Guillen and Palier 2004) arguments of ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
were marshaled as rationales for the temporary exclusion of EU8 citizens from these rights (Kvist 
2004). 
 
Just at the moment – 2004 - when free movement rights and SSP were extended legally, routes to 
access such rights were being closed off by political measures to exclude mobile citizens from the 
economically poorest states of the EU. Furthermore, as we have found, shortly after the end of 
these political transitional measures for the EU8 (in 2013/4), and subsequent to the economic 
collapse of two of the EU15, Spain and Greece, CJEU jurisprudence to close off access to social 
security (although not portability per se) emerged.  
 
The economic inequalities between more recently acceded member states and the wealthier 
countries of the EU15, are perceived to generate high incentives to move and work. Indeed, from a 
                                                 
10 The UK and Sweden from our TRANSWEL cases (plus the Republic of Ireland) did not impose controls in 2004; Of the 
EU15, only Sweden did not impose controls in 2007; Hungary also imposed controls for some occupations in 2007. 
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Union-wide perspective, labour mobility is promoted as a boost to the ‘European’ economy, and as a 
means to sustain welfare states by providing staff (Hansen and Hager 2010, Recchi 2015). In the mid-
2000s, this was reflected in strategies of labour recruitment among wealthier Western/Northern 
member states. However, this recruitment was imagined selectively ‘filling labour market gaps’, with 
underpinning utilitarian expectations about trade-offs regarding costs and benefits of intra-EU 
migration, against wider ethnic and post-colonial framings and assumptions (covering a number of 
our TRANSWEL countries, cf: Menz 2009, Paul 2013, 2015). In addition, portability also implies the 
export of social security from richer countries to ones with lower standards of living and lower 
(sometimes much lower) average earnings, and this has during the 2010s coloured expectations of 
mobility, strategies of closure, and political discourses of exclusion in some, but not all, member 
states (Bruzelius et al. 2014).   
 
The political economy of recent accessions contextualizes SSP governance and enables us to observe 
that free movement and social security ‘rights’ appear politically contingent, even as the portability 
regulations of 2004 expanded some entitlements, for example to family benefits, parental leave.  
 
4.2.2 Welfare system diversity and reform 
The accessions of 2004 and 2007 not only radically altered the political economy of the EU, they also 
increased the diversity in political economy of welfare. Insofar as SSP regulation depends on the 
similarity of welfare systems, and presumptions of contributory-based benefits, the increased 
diversity of welfare systems in the EU has made SSP regulation more complex.  There are three 
aspects to this complexity. First, the number of different welfare systems in the EU has radically 
expanded in the last two decades. This range of welfare systems increases the diversity of norms, 
definitions and organisational structures that must be accommodated in transnational SSP 
regulation. Second, this diversity is compounded by the characteristics of welfare reforms of the last 
10-20 years, which have marked a number of benefits with increasing conditionality (especially 
unemployment-related benefits), higher contributions, and greater use of private provision or 
marketised organisation of provision, such as consumer selection of health insurance provider 
(Morel et al. 2012, Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2012). The third aspect concerns the diversity of 
arrangements in specific policy areas, some, but not all of which is directly affected by these reforms 
(Ferragina et al. 2015); we address this issue in section 4.2.3 below. 
 
Table 4.1 below provides a very crude summary of key differences among our eight countries in 
terms of the global structure of social expenditure as % of GDP. We can observe that the relative 
weight of expenditure is variable within countries, with a strong orientation of expenditure on 
families in the UK and Sweden, and relative higher proportionate expenditure on pensions in 
Germany (which has a large ageing population) and Poland (which does not). The strongest contrast 
in overall expenditure between our country cases is between Estonia and Sweden – which reflects 
the literature emphasising the especially residual and neo-liberal characteristics of social protection 
in Estonia and other Baltic states.  Overall levels of expenditure in the EU8 is lower than in our EU15 
countries, although these differences are more marked in health and pensions (except between 
Estonia and Sweden) than in family benefits (except between Poland and the UK) or unemployment 
benefits.  
 
This table, however, does not indicate the institutional structures which shape this diversity of 
expenditure, and the comparability of this data should be treated with caution, as it does not 
indicate levels of expenditure (i.e. 10.6% of German GDP is considerably more in monetary terms 
than 10.8% of Polish GDP). For a more nuanced picture of the welfare systems of the TRANSWEL 
countries, we need to consider their institutional structures, and, importantly for our interest in SSP 
regulation, the general mechanisms (ie for non-migrants) used for securing eligibility and access to 
social security, which then affect portability for migrants. 
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Table 4.1: Share of total public spending as a % of GDP, by country and policy area, 2013 
 
 Unemployment Family benefits Health Pensions Total1 
Bulgaria 0.5 1.8 4.4 7.6 
17.0 
Germany 1.1 3.1 9.5 9.0 
27.7 
Hungary 0.5 2.5 4.9 9.6 
20.6 
Austria 1.6 2.8 7.3 12.8 
28.9 
Estonia 0.5 1.6 4.1 6.5 
14.6 
Sweden 1.2 3.1 7.5 12.4 
29.4 
Poland2 0.3 0.8 4.1 8.5 
17.2 
UK 0.6 3.0 8.5 11.8 
27.8 
Source: Eurostat. 
Notes: 1. Includes all public social expenditure (including housing, income support and others). 2.  Data for Poland from 
2012. 
 
 
Table 4.2 below summarises the key characteristics of the ‘types’ of welfare system that might 
generally be applied to the eight country-cases of TRANSWEL. At the level of ‘regime’, our eight 
cases fall into four of the generally recognised ‘worlds of welfare’ or families of welfare system. 
Despite their diversity, all four of our EU8 countries are in general terms classified as a reflecting a 
single type of ‘post-communist’ welfare.   
 
In terms of contributions and the generation of entitlement to social security (the first step in the 
classic conceptualisation of SSP regulation, we saw in figure one, above), we can broadly distinguish 
“Bismarckian” from “Beveridgean” mechanisms for accessing social benefits and services. The 
“Bismarckian” mechanisms align closely with the assumptions of SSP regulation in the literature and 
the origins of the EU’s social security co-ordination. Eligibility to benefits is secured by contributions 
made through employment; other eligibility is derived from these contributions (e.g. dependant 
family members in the ‘male breadwinner model’). In contrast, “Beveridgean” mechanisms secure 
eligibility by residence and/or need so that the relationship with employment contributions and 
access to benefits is more tenuous. The distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean welfare 
system features in the overall design of TRANSWEL, with two Bismarckian ‘destination’ countries, 
Austria and Germany, and two Beveridgean, Sweden and the UK. However, given our focus on 
comparing portability across four policy areas of unemployment, family benefits, health and 
pensions, the diversity of mechanisms to secure eligibility within one ‘model’ or type of welfare 
system is striking. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of key characteristics of welfare system types explored in TRANSWEL 
 
Model 
(TRANSWEL example) 
Key characteristics 
 
Conservative-corporatist 
(Germany, Austria) 
Contributory-based benefits and services; dependant on employment and occupations; emphasis 
on maintaining income at vulnerable times (old age, unemployment); supplementary needs-based 
tax-funded provision; emphasis on supporting families with children.  
 
Access to social security: “Bismarckian” policy mechanisms for unemployment, health & pensions; 
mixed requirements for family benefits. 
Social Democratic 
(Sweden) 
Rights-based benefits and services at high levels; oriented toward promoting equality and full 
employment for all; individualised tax/benefits; policies to promote gender equality.  
 
Access to social security: “Beveridgean” policy mechanisms for health & basic pension; 
contributory and mixed requirements for unemployment, family and second pillar pension 
Liberal 
(UK) 
 
Means-tested benefits; low levels of contributory benefits; universal services; oriented to safety-
net provision.  
 
Access to social security: “Beveridgean” policy mechanisms for health; contributory and mixed 
requirements for pension, unemployment & family benefits. 
Post-communist 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland) 
Contributory-based benefits, paid at very low levels, with very limited and low-level ‘safety-net’ 
provision; strong emphasis on private (pensions/health) and family (care) provision; support to 
families and for gender equality varies.  
 
Access to social security: “Bismarckian” policy mechanisms for pensions, unemployment and 
health; mixed for family benefits 
Source: adapted from Carmel and Papadopoulos (2016). Original sources include, inter alia: Esping-Andersen (1990), 
Cerami and Vanhuysse (2009), Aidukaite (2011)  
 
 
We find that each welfare system may adopt different mechanisms for organising eligibility 
conditions by policy area. (For example, all countries have a public pension which requires 
contributions, but Sweden also has a basic pension based on residency, while the UK pension is paid 
at a flat rate, so that the final pension income is not linked to level of contributions.) As a result, 
within each welfare system, a mix of eligibility mechanisms can be expected, linked to different 
types of conditionality. Furthermore, we can observe that a number of countries have more than 
one benefit in each policy area, and that the eligibility mechanisms affecting these frequently differ 
even within one country. (For example, Bulgaria, Germany and Sweden all have both a contributory 
‘unemployment insurance’ benefit (strongly Bismarckian), and an ‘unemployment assistance’ 
benefit, where the amount paid, and contributions required, imply a rather mixed mechanism of 
eligibility between need, residence and contributions.) Finally, the eligibility conditions for accessing 
(and therefore porting) benefits may be mixed for one type of benefit. (For example, conditions of 
residence and employment contributions may be required to access certain family benefits as in 
Austria and Poland). It is important, then to recognise that while our EU8 country cases overall have 
lower expenditures than EU15, and while our EU8 country cases conform to a generalised ‘post-
communist’ world of welfare, there are some marked differences among both the EU15 and the EU8 
countries in our study, (Aidukaite 2009). 
 
So far in this section, we have addressed general welfare system differences and the different 
mechanisms that secure eligibility to benefits and services. Now we turn to how these mixed and 
diverse mechanisms might matter for analysing SSP regulation between our country-pair cases, and 
in particular, how it might vary by policy area. 
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4.3 Diversity in benefits and implications for SSP regulation in changing socio-economic contexts 
 
In the 883/2004 Regulation, a number of new benefits, not of the classic ‘social insurance’ variety, 
were made subject to co-ordination rules. The entitlement of workers, and in some cases, non-
worker EU nationals, to access benefit on equal terms with nationals under the Citizen’s Directive 
also generated possibilities for exporting non-contributory social benefits from one member state to 
another (notably, some child benefits). The initial categorisation of a benefit in Regulation 883/2004 
is crucial for shaping whether it should be subject to co-ordination rules at all, and then, which co-
ordination rules apply. We know that benefit categorisations and conditionality is important in 
shaping access, entitlement and portability. We also know that these categorisations and 
conditionality vary by welfare system (as well as over time).  
 
So what do we know about the variation in SSP regulation for different types of benefit and how are 
they shaped by changing socio-economic contexts of work, mobility and family life? 
 
4.3.1 Unemployment 
Assessing the EU policies and framework as they apply bi-laterally between pairs of member states is 
made more difficult as they are caught between technical legal specificity and highly politicised 
domestic contexts, especially in relation to unemployment benefits. As we will show in sections six 
and seven, generalised increases in conditionality especially in relation to unemployment, challenge 
the presumption that vested rights (of contributions) are straightforwardly related to social security 
eligibility (and thus portability). Indeed, to some extent this has always been the case; as Clasen and 
Clegg (2007) have identified, there is more than one kind of condition that is applied to social 
security eligibility. They classify three types: conditions of category (are you unemployed, a mother, 
disabled), circumstance (impoverished, with contributions), and conduct (most important for 
unemployed). It is conditions of conduct that recent policy reforms towards ‘social investment’ have 
enhanced (e.g. van Berkel et al. 2012). For EU migrants, as we saw in section three, these conditions 
are also shaped by jurisprudence on ‘genuine and effective work’, ‘habitual residence’, and ‘genuine 
chance of being engaged’, creating a distinctive mix of conditions of category, circumstance and 
conduct which must apply in their case, as we show in detail in sections six and seven.  
 
Unemployment assistance, which has been at the heart of ‘activating’ reforms in the EU 15 over the 
last two decades, is variously categorised by member states to be (or not be) a ‘social security 
benefit’. This in turn determines whether conditionality of this benefit at national level is regulated 
by 883/2004, and its associated case law. In this case, definitions of what is work and who is a 
worker is vital, and a number of member states, including three countries in the TRANSWEL study, 
Germany, Austria and the UK have each recently tightened their criteria for what counts as “genuine 
and effective work”, which is so important for conditioning access and portability of social security in 
practice (O’Brien et al 2016).  
 
With increases in precarious employment in many member states, then this could become a burden 
on migrant workers to show that they are, indeed, workers (O'Brien et al. 2016). The changes in 
patterns of employment, especially increased precarious and so-called ‘atypical’ employment11, with 
consequently reduced access to social insurance directly affect access to and portability of benefits. 
The wide interpretation of ‘work’ and ‘worker’ in free movement and case law sits very uneasily with 
member states’ definitions, even though EU case law allows for granting of rights to precarious 
workers which can help the protection of mobile citizens. The privileging of ‘worker’ status and the 
treatment of rules and protections for non-workers as ‘exceptional’ matters. The question of what is 
work, and who is a worker, shapes the transnational (sending and receiving countries’) 
                                                 
11 A catch-all term referring to any employment that is fixed term, part-time (including variable hours), or not directly with 
the employer for whom the work is carried out (ie agency work). 
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(non)implementation of EU laws, and thus the relations of inclusion/exclusion that underpin SSP in 
member states, but it does so in ambiguous ways (for a recent analysis on the UK, see Shutes 
(2016)).  These definitional questions about the worker and work are of central importance for 
reform of EU policy in this area. Furthermore, mobile citizens’ social rights are problematically 
related to the issue of ‘work’.  
 
In the context of labour market dualisation in our Austrian and German cases (Palier 2010, Seeleib-
Kaiser 2011), as well as already extensive precarity in the UK, and low levels of employment 
protection in the post-communist welfare states (at its most extreme in Estonia), these legal 
definitions confront a European political economy which positions ever more of such ambiguously 
defined ‘workers’ as precariously employed (Berggren et al. 2007a, b).  Furthermore, our interviews 
with policy experts showed that with increased conditionality of benefits, comes reduced political 
legitimacy for portability. Thus if strict conditions apply for receipt of unemployment benefit in 
country A, why should a claimant be able to move to country B, and receive the same benefit, 
without having to fulfil such conditions? (also Jorens et al 2013).  
 
In our study, this would lead us to expect that migrants with regular employment biographies, 
moving between welfare systems with strongly contributory systems, would be able to access and 
port unemployment insurance benefits (Bulgaria-Germany; Hungary-Austria; Estonia-Sweden). In 
these cases, the most financially beneficial strategy would vary according to the direction of 
migration, and, as we will see in sections 6 and 7, the type of migration as well (e.g. 
temporary/permanent)12.  
 
However, all these cases rest on assumptions about the ability of EU migrants to secure such 
portability, and they do not address questions of eligibility for unemployment assistance, with their 
more mixed conditions, and sometimes (cf Germany and the UK) strongly conditional requirements, 
nor how these intersect with residence requirements. These cases are discussed more fully in 
sections six and seven. 
 
4.3.2 Family benefits 
Of all our policy areas, family benefits present the most diverse set of benefits, with distinct 
underpinning norms and expectations, different purposes, and embedded in various definitions of 
the ‘family’, and different approaches to state provision of financial support for families (Lewis et al. 
2008, Inglot et al. 2012, Javornik 2014). They are also the set of benefits which least conform to 
social security co-ordination Regulation 883/2004. As discussed in section 4.1, 883/2004 included 
some benefits in the co-ordination mechanism for the first time – notably in recognition of the 
expansion of the rights of employed parents to maternity, paternity and parental leave benefits. 
(This was itself a recognition of the changes in employment patterns from the Fordist, male 
breadwinner model which was so important in the founding regulation of SSP in the EU.) While 
these benefits were included in 883/2004 in recognition of EU migrants’ worker-parent status, 
domestic policies can be tied to additional conditions of conduct (e.g. in Austria, requiring certified 
medical check-ups during pregnancy), or which might involve very different gendering of benefits 
(e.g. Sweden and Germany provide specific incentives for fathers to take parental leave, while in 
other cases, the bulk of leave is only available to mothers).  
 
Families of migrants, including dependant children, do not always reside with their migrant parents. 
They may come and go at different points in their education, and they may be resident with the 
other parent as a result of relationship separation or simply due to migration. Those countries that 
                                                 
12 According to the EU framework of course, the degree of mobility between countries should not in principle, affect 
portability; the purpose of Regulation 883/2004 as described in section three above, is to overcome disadvantages of 
mobility.  
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offer family benefits for the upbringing of resident children are generally not portable, as the 
definition of the benefit itself determines the need for co-residence of both parent and child in the 
household. However, the requirement for equal treatment led to the availability of child benefit for 
the children of nationals and EU nationals, even where those children live abroad. This ‘portability’ 
then, does not come from Regulation 883/2004, but the Citizens’ Directive 2004/38. Following 
politicization of this benefit entitlement, especially in Germany and the UK, it is now possible for the 
member state where the parent is resident to pay the child benefit at the same level as the member 
state where the child is resident.  
 
These differences present a more complex and nuanced relationship between accumulation of 
contributions, securing entitlement, and the ability to port contributions and benefits, than is 
implied in the classic conceptualization of portability we showed in figure one.  These differences 
also imply that sensitivity to possible incompatibilities between welfare systems could be particularly 
significant for our analysis of these benefits (and also very important, given their potentially 
gendered effects.) 
 
This diversity, and sets up a rather ambivalent relationship between the organization of family 
benefits and the assumptions of SSP regulation (around contributions, and the nature of 
employment, for example). In our study, we would expect somewhat complex and perhaps 
problematic arrangements in SSP regulation across all four country-pair cases for family benefits, 
except in relation to child benefit, where the jurisprudence is explicit and benefits straightforward to 
conceptualise as equivalent. 
 
4.3.3 Health insurance/healthcare 
In relation to healthcare, the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) was a significant innovation in 
transnational social provision, introduced at the same time as 883/2004 reforming social security co-
ordination. It acts as a mechanism for the portability of health insurance (and healthcare coverage in 
Beveridgean systems). The EHIC must be applied for in the country of residence, but can be 
presented to pay for emergency healthcare in any other member state in the first three months of 
residence (what counts as emergency is broadly defined). The costs of that healthcare are then re-
imbursed to the member state by the country of residence. In addition, the 2011 Directive on cross-
border healthcare could also be used by mobile citizens, seeking treatment for approved procedures 
in another Member state. However, overlapping rules are likely to make already very complex 
legislation on health more difficult for migrants to understand. Greer and Sokol (2014: 20) argue that 
although the CJEU reinforces the right to health care in all EU countries, access to healthcare 
remains unequal because health care in each member state is different. ‘[T]he ECJ [sic] has 
developed a second-order jurisprudence of social citizenship rights and therefore of EU social 
citizenship as a set of rules for determining the legitimate content of Member States’ social 
citizenship rights….it is moving towards ‘rules for rights’: setting principles by which to judge the 
rules Member States use to make decisions about social rights.’13 As we will see in sections six, seven 
and eight, below, the emphasis on ‘rules for rights’ which marks the attempt to protect member 
state subsidiarity in social protection can generate a high degree of legal and institutional 
complexity, and thus barriers to access and portability, in healthcare and other domains of social 
security. 
 
In our study, we would expect that healthcare coverage for very short-term movement of migrants 
would be unproblematic: institutionally, the EHIC represents a full Europeanisation of SSP regulation. 
Furthermore, we would expect migrants moving between insurance-based healthcare systems 
                                                 
13 This concept of ‘rules for rights’ also appears relevant in the jurisprudence on social assistance, which has been 
increasingly accepting of member state restrictions on benefits for economic inactive EU citizens (cases of Dano, 
Alimanovic, Commission vs UK, discussed in section three above.) 
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(Bulgaria-Germany, Hungary-Austria) to face least difficulties in porting their health insurance rights, 
and having these recognised in their country of migration and return, due to the good institutional 
fit bilaterally (similar welfare arrangements) and multi-laterally (the contributory basis fits with the 
underpinning rationale of social security co-ordination). It is, however, unclear how migrants’ access 
to health insurance might be affected by the institutional complexity of health insurance 
arrangements in more marketised systems (affecting our Bulgaria-Germany case) and federally 
diverse systems (affecting our Hungary-Austria case and Bulgaria-Germany case). It is also less clear 
how migrants’ rights to access and port healthcare cover might affect moving between hybrid 
insurance/tax-based systems of post-communist welfare states and tax-based “Beveridgean” 
systems (Estonia-Sweden, Poland-UK). In Sweden and the UK special arrangements might be 
expected, in order to distinguish between EU workers, entitled to access healthcare on the same 
basis as nationals, and EU non-workers, who under the EU framework are expected to have 
‘comprehensive health insurance’. In all our country-pair cases, we might expect cross-cutting 
regulatory effects of the Directive on cross-border healthcare, as the minimum requirements set out 
in this Directive enables EU nationals to access (some) healthcare in another member state, rather 
than formally seeking health insurance cover in their country of residence.  
 
4.3.4 Pensions 
As we saw in section 2.1, the portability of pensions is relatively well-understood, both generally and 
in the EU. The literature on SSP regulation almost exclusively explores old-age benefits, because it is 
particularly important for securing these long-term benefits, and as often they require long-term 
contributions, and these contributions would otherwise be lost in the process of migration. Such 
benefits have the biggest financial implications for the countries of residence (Holzmann and Koettl 
2014). For current workers, each of our TRANSWEL country cases has a contributory public pension 
scheme, in some cases offering future pensions at low levels of benefit (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and the UK). Across all eight cases, there are diverse requirements for individuals to have 
additional private personal or occupational pensions.  
 
In our study, in general, we would expect the portability of pension contributions and benefits to be 
the least problematic for migrants, relative to other social security benefits. Pensions rely on 
contributions over the long-term, where the amount of final benefit is least affected by short-term 
moves. In all our eight cases, the contributory principle is applied, except for the Swedish basic 
pension, which is residence-based. We would expect migrants moving between countries with 
“Bismarckian” welfare systems to face the least restrictions (Bulgaria-Germany, Austria-Hungary), as 
these rely strongly on the contributory principle that underpins social security co-ordination in the 
EU. A move between similarly structured systems also represents a good institutional fit for the 
transfer of vested rights (our Bulgaria-Germany case). Migrants facing least losses will be those 
moving between systems with shorter minimum contributions periods. 
 
However, Dwyer and Papadimitriou (2006) expose the ways in which the EU policy and Member 
State policy can weaken the social security rights of older migrant EU citizens when they choose to 
move to another Member State following retirement from the paid labour market. Meyer et al. 
(2013: 724) show that gaps in regulation on pensions at EU and national levels ‘expos[e] workers to 
the distortions that affect early leavers of schemes’. Consequently, the situation of mobile people on 
retirement depends on movement between varying types of pension systems, and can be 
problematic or disadvantageous for certain types of workers. Meyer et al (2013) found that low-
income workers who move from a Beveridgean system to a Bismarckian are most vulnerable to a 
pension loss because there is stronger redistribution in the Beveridgean systems. In contrast, 
migrants moving from the poorer East to the richer West (or from Bismarckian systems to 
Beveridgean systems) are more likely to gain than to lose, as long as they spend a substantial time 
working in the country of immigration (generating contributions and entitlements) (Meyer, Bridgen 
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and Andow 2013). We have emphasised this caveat to their argument, as it implies that EU workers 
with higher mobility, perhaps moving between pension systems more than once or twice, may face 
more losses to their final pension income. It could thus significantly affect the socio-economic 
implications of how relationship of mobility, work and residence are constructed in our four country-
pair cases. In addition, given the complexity of contribution mechanisms for individual pension 
systems in practice, we should attend to how these might affect the more precariously employed 
and the more mobile, which may reveal socio-economic inequalities in how the dynamic relationship 
between mobility, work and residence embedded in regulations might play out for EU mobile 
workers in practice. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
The social security coordination mechanism within the EU Member States is not neutral in its effects 
at the country level due to differences between welfare systems and their traditions.  Managing the 
tension between changed contexts and migrant experiences with the underpinning assumptions of 
the key regulation (883/2004 and 987/2007) is one of the key factors behind burgeoning EU case law 
and changes in domestic regulation changes. Thus also increasing complexity of the overall 
regulatory environment, within which migrants and social security decision-makers must operate. 
Indeed, many of the complexities of SSP regulation which we identify in sections six to eight of this 
working paper stem from such unresolved and half-resolved contradictions and tensions between 
EU regulations, and transnational (bilateral) regulatory fit, the contrasting assumptions that 
underpin these regulations bilaterally and in the wider EU framework, and the rather more complex 
and rapidly changing patterns and experiences of mobility and employment.14   
                                                 
14 Migrants who undertake employment below any minimum threshold, or who work informally, of course, would not be 
covered by these regulations in terms of portability at all.  In later workpackages of TRANSWEL, we explore the experiences 
of EU workers with experience of of irregular employment. 
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V Summary of methodology and methods 
 
A full exposition of the research design, methodology and methods for the research presented in 
this paper can be found in a separate methodological report.15  Here we provide a summative 
overview of the interpretive approach to policy analysis underpinning the research strategy, and 
indicate how the comparative and the transnational elements of the research were integrated. 
 
5.1  Interpretive policy analysis 
 
The research strategy and methodology developed for our policy analysis needed to generate robust 
data to systematically analyse and compare the principles and underpinning rationales of SSP 
regulation in our 4 country-pair cases. This in turn would enable us to address our second research 
question and explore how welfare systems’ conditionalities organize, condition, and set limits to the 
acquisition and portability of social security rights. An inductive, transnational and comparative 
research design that considers the ‘sending’ and the ‘receiving’ countries’ perspectives was 
developed for the regulatory analysis. Befitting our interest in how the dynamic relations between 
mobility, residence and work are inscribed in SSP regulation (section 2.1), and how they generate 
and shape possibilities for inclusion, exclusion and stratification, overall, our approach was informed 
by perspectives from Interpretive Policy Analysis (Yanow 2000, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).  
 
IPA is an umbrella term, referring to phenomenological policy analysis, which analyses both the 
processes of policy production, and policies themselves, as meaning-making, and meaning-bearing 
process (Wagenaar 2011). Typically, IPA strongly emphasises qualitative research methods, such as 
standard or documentary ethnographies, discourse analysis, and/or narrative analysis. The emphasis 
is on understanding the highly contextualized socio-political conditions in which ‘policy’ is produced 
and practiced, or in which discourses and practices become ‘policy’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 
2014). 
 
As we showed in sections three and four, the formal EU framework of law and jurisprudence is 
historically variable and contingently subject to re-interpretation over time. In addition, the EU 
framework itself changes meaning in processes of subject to political and policy ‘translation’ (Clarke 
et al. 2015) re-interpretation and re-construction. SSP regulation, and its underpinning rationales, 
has varied significance for different migrants, and in different socio-economic and institutional 
contexts.  As we have also seen, classic distinctions in the literature, between “Beveridgean” and 
“Bismarckian” mechanisms of eligibility, or between different welfare regimes, point to important 
features which might affect SSP. However, specific benefits are subject to more varied or mixed 
mechanisms of eligibility and SSP regulation is of course also embedded in cross-cutting 
transnational regulations at the EU level. A prior analytical framework based on these existing 
concepts developed for national welfare states would have not enabled us to identify the 
transnational (bilateral) SSP regulation, nor how these intersected with the supranational (European) 
legal framework.  
 
In keeping with a broad IPA approach, then, an inductive research strategy was developed with a 
view to identifying the assemblage(s) of SSP regulation that transnationally structure the portability 
of EU migrants’ social security rights (research question one). Eventually the aim of our research 
strategy was to (re)construct how these assemblage(s) of SSP regulation (Amelina 2016 f/c) establish 
conditions to portability for different categories of migrant in our four country-pair cases, and to 
make visible the conditionalities which shape the acquisition and exercise of social security 
                                                 
15 This is available from the authors at: E.K.Carmel@bath.ac.uk. 
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portability. Such a ‘reconstructive’ analysis requires highly contextualised and reflexive treatment of 
formal legal regulations. It is open-ended, demanding and iterative approach to policy analysis – 
even in one country case (Carmel 1999, 2017 f/c). However, it was in working inductively that we 
were able to address how conventional domestic regulations on social security access are implicated 
in shaping social security portability for EU migrants. 
 
5.2  Research design, strategy and process 
 
Our research design was oriented to the generation of data and procedures for our interpretive 
analysis, in order to illuminate, and compare the implicit logics and rationalities, which underpin the 
principles of portability instantiated in the regulations we analysed. We had to compare several 
aspects of SSP regulation: 
 
- Country pair cases, examining portability related to migration between two specific welfare 
systems 
- Policy domains 
- Migrant categories 
- Institutional conditions 
- Relationship to the EU regulatory framework 
 
This analysis is therefore is transnational in two dimensions: both bilaterally in country-pairs but also 
how those country-pairs’ regulatory framework is embedded in transnational portability governance 
across the EU., as well as comparative across the country-pair cases. Our first step for comparability 
was to identify the functional equivalents of benefits across our four policy areas. For each of our 
four policy areas, we examined broad functional equivalents:  
 
Unemployment benefits: unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance 
Family benefits: child benefit, maternity, paternity and parental leave & benefits; childcare/raising 
benefits 
Healthcare: health insurance and sickness insurance 
Old age pensions: basic state pension and ‘second pillar’ public or statutory pension  
 
The full list of selected equivalents in languages of origin is presented in tables in annex 1. 
 
The data was collated in a series of tables by individual country teams, providing details of the 
formal regulations and their interpretation. The data was sourced from laws, secondary legislation 
and regulatory guidelines, including quantitative data where available, and secondary literature in all 
eight countries.  
 
In addition to the detailed documentary analysis, the TRANSWEL research teams conducted 
interviews with 16 key informant interviews, such as welfare rights workers, lawyers and 
practitioners, which were particularly vital in generating, clarifying and specifying the content of the 
transnational comparative tables. A further 28 senior policy experts, officials from ministries, policy 
advisors and senior legal experts were interviewed to gain insight into their interpretations, 
experiences and understandings of EU regulation of social security rights of free movers and its 
intersection with their national context. 
 
In keeping with the interpretive and inductive approach, while wishing to have a systematic 
framework for the comparative analysis, we chose to develop the research step-wise and in a highly 
iterative process. Each step involved the generation and organization of data to enhance our 
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understanding of the conditions shaping portability which are contained in, or produced by, the 
transnational regulatory frameworks of social provisions in our four country-pair cases.  
 
The key steps were:  
 
1) Summarising the key conditions affecting access to social rights in tables for each all of our 8 
countries by each country team. This was supplemeted with a contextual presentation of secondary 
information on the welfare system, migration and political context around EU migration. A 
comparative interrogation of this data by the authors of this report resulted in iterative questions on 
individual cases.  
 
2) Production of revised transnational tables by each country team identifying key conditions 
affecting mobile citizens in our country pair cases. A comparative interrogation of this data resulted 
in further iterative questions on individual country-pair cases.  
 
3) A third set of data were then produced by each country team, to explore the conditions shaping 
portability in relation to specific categories of migrant in each country-pair case. These categories of 
migrant at their crudest are: the one-time migrant, the returnee and the temporary/circular migrant. 
 
4) The final, and very significant, contributing source of data were the summaries of interviews with 
senior policy experts in each country-pair case. 
  
Overall, our research exposed the regulatory conditions under which EU mobile citizens might 
experience portability. This was achieved by identifying, analyzing and evaluating the institutional 
conditions for portability of social rights by policy area and country pair. 
 
5.3  Comparative transnational data analysis 
 
Given the migrant-centred focus of TRANSWEL overall, it was important for us to be able to compare 
the implications of welfare conditionalities produced in SSP regulation in our country-pair cases, as 
reflected in our second research question, and our interest in the transnational governance of 
portability. To undertake this analysis, we drew on the contributions of the ‘model families method’ 
in policy research (e.g. Kilkey 2000, Bradshaw and Finch 2002). 
 
During our analysis at stage (2)  - comparing the transnational regulations shaping SSP between our 
paired EU8 and EU15 countries - we identified three broad categories of migrant for whom access to 
social security rights is strongly shaped by their mobility history:  
  
- The one-time migrant 
- The returnee 
- The circular/temporary migrant 
 
These three categories of EU mobile citizens are particularly important as the length of residency 
(and length of contributions) influence their ability to access and port social security rights and/or 
benefits. Conditionalities in SSP regulation in the EU framework, as well as eligibility criteria at the 
national level have different implications for different categories of migrants. In stage three of our 
research, the TRANSWEL researchers compiled tables to systematically compare how their 
transnational country-pair case established conditionality for each category of migrant. These 
categories of migrant were further specified according to their mobility history (as part of 
TRANSWEL’s interest in temporary and permanent migration, and mobility). Annex 2 provides a  
sample table for this data. 
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Our summative comparison, involved synthesizing the findings from the descriptions of welfare 
systems with the findings regarding conditionality faced by specific categories (and ‘sub-categories’) 
of migrant. It was this stage of research that enabled us to consider the implications of this analysis 
by migrant category Thus our final comparative analysis we developed tables for each benefit and 
country-pair case to compare 
 
- Conditions affecting an individual’s access to social security rights for each benefit type in a 
country-pair case (the columns of these tables) 
- Assemblages of conditions acting together as portability-gateways for each benefit type in a 
country-pair case (each row in our tables)  
 
The individual conditions were identified by analyzing and comparing the how the regulations 
between our EU8 and EU15 constructed or assembled specific combinations of condition faced by 
particular migrant categories. These conditions were analysed and set out systematically in the 
format indicated below (table 5.1) for each benefit in each of our four (country-pair) cases. Annex 3 
outlines the analysis and weighting of these specific conditions by country pair case and where 
necessary explains the rationale for selecting criteria in this way. The identification of these 
conditions forms both part of our findings, as well as the backdrop to the comparative analysis by 
benefit type presented in section seven. Details of each condition, and why they are important in 
general, are provided in section 7.1.16 
 
Table 5.1 Institutional conditions for portability of social rights – sample table 
 
 
 
When weighing up the significance of individual conditions, we also needed to consider that some 
individual conditions are more significant than others; the significance of particular conditions may 
vary by policy area; the interplay of different conditions matters as much as a simple ‘sum’ of 
conditions; countries may choose to create barriers to portability in different ways, usually because 
of actual or perceived logics and purposes of their welfare systems and of individual benefits.  
 
Therefore, our assessment, presented in section seven, is based on iterative (and repetitive) analysis 
of the relative importance of these conditions, individually and in combination, especially on the 
relationship between these conditions within different policy areas.17  
 
                                                 
16 We considered providing a summary evaluation of the ‘degree’ of conditionality for each row in this table. This would 
have offered a single reference point for each benefit in each country, defining the degree of conditionality on portability. 
However, the interlocking characteristics of conditionality, the degree of speculative judgement involved, and because we 
were exploring 4 transnational coutry-pair cases out of a much larger possible universe of EU portability cases, meant that 
it was inappropriate to offer this additional qualitative judgement. As a result, we returned our analytical focus to analyzing 
the conditions shaping portability, in particular seeking ‘gateways’ to portability, that is, sets of key conditions which jointly 
shape portability across policy areas and country-pair cases.  
17 On the basis that you need different criteria for assessing conditionality in pensions portability than you do for family 
benefits, for example. 
System/
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5.4 Summary 
Overall, one of the most striking features of the trajectory of the research and analysis for the 
research presented in this working papers is, first, that the inductive method was fundamental in 
ensuring that we maintained both the transnational and comparative dimensions to our analysis. 
Second, that the inductive method enabled us to explore and generate data which we might have 
overlooked, had we started only with a system-based questionnaire designed using pre-existing 
information, more common in the ‘model families method’ which originally inspired our approach to 
addressing the rights of different categories of migrant. 
 
Third, and by far the most important, is that the research process acted like a mirror image of the EU 
regulatory framework itself. That is, we started with the formal regulations, relatively neatly 
tabulated, and organised by reference to a number of descriptive questions. These questions were 
developed from our analytical assumptions about the relevance of key criteria of conditionality, and 
knowledge of formal regulations. However, it was in the interstices between the divergent answers 
that these questions prompted from the four research teams of TRANSWEL that our comparison 
revealed uncertainty as well diversity in the transnational regulation of portability. It was thus in the 
informal, the iterative, the persistent and the patient that the significance of institutional 
complexity, procedural demands, and dark patches of poorly understood discretion in transnational 
regulation of portability was revealed.  
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VI Comparing the regulation of social security portability transnationally by 
country-pair cases 
This section presents findings on our country-pair cases as a whole. We found that overall, the 
intersection of EU formal regulations, and domestic rules on benefit eligibility resulted in complex, 
often confusing, and sometimes indeterminate practices of SSP regulation.  
 
Partly reflecting this complexity in practices, our comparison did not find a clear cut distinction 
between cases with more strongly ‘Bismarckian’ eligibility mechanisms (Bulgaria-German, Hungary-
Austria) on the one hand, and the Beveridgean cases (Estonia-Sweden, Poland-UK) on the other. 
Rather the Bulgaria-Germany case, which in general does conform to expectations regarding its ‘fit’ 
with the EU regulatory framework, highlighted that the characteristics of the ‘matching’ (or mis-
matching) of welfare systems to the EU framework in different policy domains is an important factor 
in determining how mechanisms of portability are transnationally structured. An examination of 
those policy areas and benefits that were more complex and problematic in the Bulgaria-Germany 
case (family benefits and unemployment assistance) were those with a less good ‘institutional fit’, 
and those which were more straightforward in all  four country-pair cases (ie pensions), provides 
support for this finding. 
 
6.1  SSP regulation for labour-mobility between Bulgaria-Germany 
 
“Overall, German regulations and collaboration between the two countries make the portability of 
benefits relatively straightforward, particularly for migrants who remain in long term employment in 
Germany. However, more mobile migrants and those in short term or temporary employment can 
find it more difficult to access and to transfer entitlements in the areas of unemployment and 
healthcare. Migrants returning to Bulgaria can face challenges in transferring family benefits due to 
different approaches to data collection and in establishing entitlement.” (Amelina et al. 2016a) 
 
Unemployment: Long and inflexible contributions periods in both countries may disadvantage more 
mobile workers, even in cases involving unemployment insurance benefit (ALG I).  Between 2011 
and 2014, the number of Bulgarians receiving unemployment assistance (ALG II) increased from 9% 
to 22% of the Bulgarian population in Germany, although the overall number is very low (BAMF 
2014). Access to this basic provision for job-seekers is subject to intense scrutiny and high levels of 
discretion by employment agency decision-makers, and it is not portable. Residency requirements 
and the availability for work conditions can also exclude more mobile migrant workers from 
accessing this benefit.  
Family benefits: Most German family benefits are not portable, but are accessible by mobile EU 
citizens who live and/or work in Germany. Bulgarian migrants are entitled to receive child benefit in 
Germany (Kindergeld) for their children if the migrants live, work and/or pay taxes in Germany, even 
if the children are living in Bulgaria. However, policy experts reported that the family benefit 
regulations are different in each country and the exchange of information between family benefit 
agencies is not optimal. Some family benefits in Bulgaria are means-tested, but German family 
benefit offices do not collect data on claimants’ incomes, posing difficulties for migrants returning to 
Bulgaria. Differences in definition of ‘family’ leads to difficulties in determining whether individuals 
are entitled to receive family benefits, and in which country.  
Health: portability of insurance is highly specified in formal regulations, but the health insurance 
market is complex. Expert interviews emphasised that many mobile Bulgarian citizens do not have 
health insurance coverage in either country, creating difficulties for Bulgarians in need of healthcare 
in Germany.  
Pensions: No problems were reported with access or portability. 
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6.2  SSP regulation for labour-mobility between Estonia-Sweden 
 
“In all areas, with the exception of pensions, regulations are numerous, tend to be contradictory 
and/or ambiguous and can leave entitlement at the discretion of the decision maker. Together with 
many procedural requirements, the Swedish regulatory framework adds up to a complex, 
bureaucratic and non-transparent system that is hard to understand and navigate – and thus difficult 
for migrants to access. For most benefits, the Swedish Personal Identification Number (PIN) system 
is an obstacle to access and portability. A PIN is required to access most Swedish benefits and is also 
needed to register at any Swedish administration. Proof of employment as well as residency for 
more than one year is required for PIN acquisition – which is difficult for EU migrants in short term 
or temporary employment or who are more mobile. Unemployed and irregularly employed EU 
migrants who haven’t had formal employment in Sweden are excluded from PIN, and must show 
they hold comprehensive health insurance, either state or private….Waiting times for PINs are often 
many months.”  (Runfors et al. 2016) (see also Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2015) 
 
Unemployment: access to, and portability of unemployment benefit and contributions is strongly 
determined by the employment contract in Sweden as this also affects access to PIN. Estonian 
unemployment insurance favours return-migrants in cases where their salary abroad has been 
higher than their previous Estonian salary. As the benefits are calculated by adding both the salary 
earned in the foreign country and in Estonia they will receive higher amounts than the rest of the 
population. 
Family benefits: Migrants can in some cases be excluded from accessing and porting benefits to 
which they might otherwise be entitled. For example, the Swedish system demands splitting 
parental leave, but this is not common practice in Estonia. So couples where one parent is working in 
Estonia and the other in Sweden might meet procedural difficulties. The combination of regulatory 
complexity in Sweden, and discretionary decision-making in Estonia creates uncertainty and, in some 
cases, misinterpretations of the regulations on portability by decision-makers,  
Health: access to Sweden’s tax-funded healthcare system is dependant on PIN; for those without 
formal employment, the threshold for ‘comprehensive health insurance’ was up until 2015, very 
high. 
Pensions: no specific problems were reported regarding portability of pensions, although the high 
proportion of Estonian migrants who work in Sweden on a temporary or occasional basis ibid) may in 
the long-term put these very mobile workers at a significant disadvantage (see section 4.3.4 above).  
 
6.3  SSP regulation for labour-mobility between Hungary-Austria 
 
“Overall, EU migrants’ social protection in Austria is strongly shaped by residency requirements and 
their implementation. Making contributions is a necessary but insufficient condition for migrant 
workers to access benefits. Meeting stringent residence requirements creates significant barriers to 
portability and in comparison to other case studies, the institutional complexity of the Austrian 
system impedes portability and can generate inequalities. Our research found that individual 
migrants face uncertainty regarding their rights. This uncertainty is caused by the combined effects 
of complexities of the legal and bureaucratic system, and the high degree of discretion in decision-
making. There are some contradictory interpretations of entitlement among Austrian and Hungarian 
experts, especially in relation to family and unemployment benefits. This indicates that in some 
cases it is not obvious whether the EU or the national regulation should be applied, nor which 
country’s regulations should be invoked.” (Scheibelhofer et al. 2016). While Hungary has a strongly 
centralised social security system, the Austrian one is highly federalised, which have particular 
effects on family benefits and health coverage. This system difference can create problems of 
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communication and co-operation between institutions of the two countries. Where there are state 
(non-national) regulations, we take the case of Vienna as our reference point.  
 
Our findings point to the conclusion that there are fewer obstacles to portability on the legal level 
but rather on the administrative level – that is, governance practice. Problems with portability may 
arise from institutional complexity due to the fact that benefits are administered by 22 different 
social insurance institutions which in turn differ in the interpretation of the legal basis. Because 
administrators themselves also have quite a considerable margin of manoeuvre, there migrants may 
encounter problems with exercising their rights. 
 
Unemployment: issues relating to portability in these cases depend on the more general observation 
regarding the institutional complexity, rather than specific conditions for unemployment insurance 
benefit. In Vienna at least (see, e.g. Blauberger and Heindlmaier 2016) specific procedural 
requirements residence may also present barriers to portability. 
Family benefits: For the maternity leave (Wochengeld) only a certificate of pregnancy and a birth 
certificate are necessary. For the income-based parental allowance, both 6 months of insurance 
contributions and certification of attendance for doctors examinations are required. While these 
examinations can be undertaken abroad (so conforming to non-discrimination requirements in the 
EU legal framework), we expect that meeting these requirements may present procedural obstacles 
to access this benefit. Child benefit (Familienbeihilfe) is also a categorical benefit, and according to 
our policy expert interviews, is the most exported benefit from Austria. 
Health: Healthcare and health insurance is (also) organised by the state-level social insurance 
institutions in Austria, which may interpret the legal requirements differently. Employees above the 
marginal wage threshold are automatically insured. The exercise of discretion across the funds 
compounds the lack of clarity and may make it more difficult for migrants to secure portability of 
their health insurance. 
Pensions: there were no specific difficulties mentioned in relation to portability of pensions in this 
case, apart from equalisation payments to EU pensioners residing in Austria. 
 
6.4  SSP regulation for labour-mobility between Poland-United Kingdom  
 
 “Overall, recent reforms in the UK create more opaque decision-making processes. These have been 
made yet more complex by recent reforms. This can create difficulties for migrants trying to 
understand their rights, and for decision-makers trying to interpret regulations and exercise 
discretion in individual cases. Reformed residency and procedural requirements in the UK can 
present significant barriers to EU migrants securing unemployment and family benefits in the UK. 
Changes to decision-maker guidelines on what is ‘genuine and effective work’ and what counts as a 
‘genuine prospect of work’ for EU migrants, may present significant barriers to EU migrants’ access 
to, and portability of, social security rights. These measures especially disadvantage more mobile 
and more precariously employed migrant workers. The high levels of discretion accorded to 
decision-makers enhances uncertainty for migrants”  
 
Unemployment: Changes to key criteria introduced in 2014-15 restricted EU nationals’ access to 
social benefits in the UK. If someone’s previous employment does not meet the threshold for 
genuine and effective work, then they may lose entitlement to and therefore also portability of 
unemployment benefit. This may affect their right to reside in a country after six months.18 The 
                                                 
18 The UK is currently phasing in a new single benefit for working age people: ‘Universal Credit’.  Due to its legal 
characterization as a social assistance benefit, it would not be available to EU jobseekers (even though it is also a benefit 
with employment conditions and requirements, and will be paid to unemployed people) (Dwyer and Wright 2015).  
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Polish contributions requirements for unemployment may disadvantage temporary/circular 
migrants, as well as those with interrupted work histories. 
Family benefits: there is little possibility for portability of family benefits in the UK, outside child 
benefit. The main contributory benefit for maternity leave in the UK is tied to a single employer (and 
therefore also residence). Recent innovation in family benefits in Poland are strongly tied to 
residence as ‘child-raising’ benefits, and are not governed by portability, although Polish experts 
discussed the benefit as reducing push for outward migration.  
Health: the British NHS has limited mechanisms for generating barriers to access, and portability 
does not apply due to its tax-based funding. For returnees to Poland without employment, there is 
the procedural barrier of having to register as unemployed in order to secure healthcare cover. 
Pensions: No problems were reported in relation to portability of pensions in this case.  
 
6.5 Comparative summary 
 
Overall, our case comparisons demonstrate the importance of informal conditions and barriers for 
migrants both to ‘become entitled’ (to social rights), but also to ‘access their entitlements’, and 
therefore for the transnational portability of their social security. In the cases of Hungary-Austria, 
Estonia-Sweden and Poland-UK, relatively hidden regulatory mechanisms (operational systems and 
practices), especially in our EU15 country cases organise and dis-organise portability and access to 
social rights (‘receiving’ countries of each pair). In these three cases in particular it is precisely these 
more informal and institutional barriers which appear to transnationally structure the 
conditionalities affecting migrants acquisition of social security (access) and portability rights. These 
informal barriers may vary in each case. We did find references to discretion in the provision of 
unemployment benefits in the German case, but it is not yet clear whether this discretion concerns 
only the determination of access to unemployment assistance, or whether the application of ‘centre 
of life’ test also could be affecting access to unemployment insurance. In any case, the remaining 
three country pairs were striking for the way in which informal conditions and barriers mattered 
across different policy domains.  In particular: 
  
• Estonia-Sweden: procedural conditions especially those to access a Personal Identification 
Number (residence-based requirements around intention to stay for 12 months, and length of 
work contract)19 act as a pre-cursor to the generation of entitlements which can later be ported.  
• Hungary-Austria: residence requirements, procedural demands and discretion regulate access, 
in secondary legislation or statutory definitions and guidelines.  
• Poland-UK: residential conditions are more important, and there are high levels of conditionality 
in relation to work, including income and type of contract which act as informal barriers.  
 
Second, the comparison also demonstrates the importance of multi-layered/multi-scaled 
transnational alignment of welfare systems, both transnationally (bilaterally, between countries) and 
with the EU framework). For example, the Bulgarian-German case presents the most straightforward 
of our four country-pair cases – it is on face value the SSP success case of our study. There is a strong 
alignment of “Bismarckian” eligibility mechanisms of sole reliance on social insurance contributions 
bilaterally and this also conforms to the assumptions of EU regulations, as outlined in section four. In 
this case, in general, portability regulations were well-understood, in general could be applied in 
rather straightforward ways, and our policy experts reported that communication was effective. This 
also appears to contribute to the lower informal barriers to portability identified in this case. While 
the literature would expect a similar alignment in respect of our other “Bismarckian” case, Hungary-
Austria case, it seems that the strong federalist characteristics of Austrian welfare, may have 
                                                 
19 See discussion of factors that can be considered by member states when identifying ‘habitual residence’, discussed in 
section 3.2 above. 
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contributed to the importance of informal barriers in this latter case, as institutional complexity 
compounds regulatory complexity in relation to the EU framework. (This was confirmed by policy 
experts in Austria.) 
 
In relation to these two findings, however, policy experts interviewed from our ‘sending’, EU8, 
countries rather underemphasised the problems of complexity and implementation which were so 
important in generating informal barriers and conditionality in our EU15 countries. The EU 
framework was viewed as rather straightforward to implement; problems were seen as rather 
technical, minor, and specific. Policy experts from the EU8 countries did raise issues regarding the 
alignment of welfare systems and definitions bilaterally, but these were also expressed as technical 
problems of administration, for which technological solutions should be developed at a faster pace 
(especially evident in interviews with Estonian and Bulgarian experts). 
 
Third, from an overall EU perspective, in all cases except Bulgaria-Germany, our research found that 
the residency and procedural conditions, stemming directly from the transposition of EU Regulations 
and Directives, may in practice prevent some migrants from generating their entitlements across a 
number of benefits, and therefore prevent portability which these regulations were designed to 
faciitate.  
 
In particular, we have already discussed in section 3.2 above, the requirement in the EU social 
security co-ordination regulations, for an ‘economically active’ migrant to prove ‘centre of life’ or 
‘habitual residence’ before accessing entitlements, which was established in Regulations 883/2004 
and 987/2009 as a means of identifying the ‘competent’ member state for providing, porting or 
financing benefits and contributions. Our findings suggest that these requirements, when combined 
with other national or procedural requirements, could be so discretionary and restrictive that 
migrants may not be able to generate entitlement in practice. This is especially the case if the 
‘economically active’ migrants move between countries more than once, because administrative 
discretion is often especially important, and residency conditions harder to meet, in such cases. This 
means that the formal EU regulatory framework, designed to provide ‘rights’ to social security, is 
subverted in national regulatory practices to create obstacles to accessing those rights. Indeed, the 
very requirements of Regulation 883/2004 designed to generate portability of mobile workers’ social 
security, intersect with domestic regulation in ways which can prevent such workers from generating 
entitlements in the first place. 
 
Despite the general cross-case findings, however, our fourth finding is that SSP regulation 
transnationally structures portability by policy area/benefit in each case. This is best illustrated by 
attending to two exceptions to the general findings above. The alignment of welfare systems in the 
Bulgaria-Germany case was much more problematic in the case of family benefits, where definitions 
of the family were different in each country, and administrative rules were contentious, according to 
policy expert interviews. Another exception is that in all four transnational cases, pensions 
portability was least subject to informal barriers, whether of residency or employment. As expected 
from our discussion in section 4.3, the eligibility mechanisms in each policy area significantly 
structure welfare conditionalities faced on mobile EU citizens. It is the issue of variability of 
conditionality by policy area which is addressed in the next section.  
 43 
 
 
VII Comparing conditionality of portability regulations by policy area and 
category of migrant 
 
7.1 Transnational structuring of access and portability of social security for ‘economically active’ 
mobile EU-citizens 
 
As discussed in section five, in order to address the second of our research questions, we need to 
identify how welfare conditionalities organise and selective structure migrants’ acquisition and 
portability of social security rights. In our transnational analysis of welfare systems, we identified the 
following individual conditions as establishing the terms under which migrants might access and port 
social security. We identified these conditions by comparing the transnational country-pair 
regulations (how welfare system regulations worked jointly in different policy areas, see section 4.3 
and section six), and by exploring their intersection with the EU framework (section 3). While the 
individual conditions each play a role in generating access to social security for EU migrants, overall, 
their interplay shapes portability. So what are these conditions ? (see Table 5.1, above) 
 
EU framework. The entire TRANSWEL project is premised on an investigation into the EU as a 
‘portability rights’-granting domain, starting from the assumption that portability can be understood 
sociologically as a regime comprising several elements (regulations, discourses, practices and 
experiences), which each interact to shape social inequalities as a result. However, our discussion in 
sections three and four showed that as the characteristics and conditionalities attached to benefits 
vary by policy area, as well as by country case. Thus in our country-pair case comparisons we also 
included an evaluation of the specificity and/or restrictiveness of the EU legislative framework which 
applies in each case. 
 
A. RESIDENCY 
Habitual Residency/centre of life test. The HR test is in most cases a key ‘gateway’ to portability for 
EU migrants, although it is tested to a greater or lesser degree for different categories of migrant 
and it is tested with a greater or lesser degree of specificity (and demands) in different countries.  
 
Length of residency requirements. Residency was a key criteria in all cases, sometimes as a barrier to 
portability and sometimes simply adding to the complexity of the regulation. Our categorisations are 
organized on the basis of the relevance of these lengths of time to regulations in our country-pair 
cases. In some cases the lengths of time relate directly to EU regulations (esp 883/2004), and in 
some cases these requirements are independent of EU regulation. 
 
Additional residency requirements. In some cases – especially, of course, family benefits, but also 
unemployment assistance and even health insurance– additional residency requirements can 
establish significant conditions on access to benefits for mobile people (contributing to our 
‘portability-gateway’ –the assemblage of conditions for portability). 
 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS20 
Length and continuity of contributions. For mobile people, it is not just the length of contributions to 
an insurance scheme which matters, but also the continuity of contributions - over what time period 
are, for example, migrants expected to make continuous contributions in order to generate 
                                                 
20 We originally included an assessment of the income thresholds at which contributions should be paid, which we consider 
important for understanding the ways in which access and portability of social security are classed. However,  
methodological issues with identifying the equivalence of these thresholds across our 8 countries mean that we have not 
included them here.  
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entitlement? As a result, length of contributions and continuity should be assessed jointly. To give an 
example, if a person must make 12 months contributions over 2 years to establish entitlement to 
unemployment insurance (Germany), this is less of a barrier to portability for our Bulgarian migrants 
than the same length of contributions over 12 months. 
 
Length of benefit entitlement. For one-time migrants, if the time limit is very short, this may affect 
their position due to legal constraints on their ‘recourse to public funds’ or even their right to reside 
in the country of migration once entitlement ends. For circular migrants, the implications of 
extensive mobility for benefit receipt, make this condition perhaps especially important. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL 
Procedural requirements: The idea here was to capture requirements to, for example, complete 
forms before migrating, to register unemployed (e.g. in order to get health insurance, even if you are 
not entitled to unemployment insurance or assistance), undergo specific registration procedures. 
We assumed that for mobile EU citizens, the more demanding the procedural requirements, the 
higher the barrier to portability. Very often, but not only, these procedural requirements are for 
anyone wishing to access a benefit/entitlement, rather than migrants in particular. We identified 3 
especially common procedural requirements of especial importance for migrants (which also vary by 
benefit type and by country-case pair). They are 1) attendance at meetings/training/medical tests 
more than once a month. 2) Formal registration for a special number or card, involving an 
interview/attendance at special tax or social insurance office. 3) Requirement to register as 
unemployed (even if not entitled to benefit) in order to receive another benefit.  
 
Institutional complexity: where a migrant might have to meet the conditions or requirements 
established by more than one institution (e.g. a local authority and a social insurance body), or 
where it may not be clear which institutional body would be the more important or with a definitive 
position, then the mobile worker and their family will face barriers of ‘institutional complexity’, 
which could affect access and portability of their social security rights.  
 
Discretion: The role of discretion in our analysis was especially important, and deserves further 
exploration than is possible in this working paper. There were two aspects of ‘discretion’ that shaped 
conditions of access and portability. First, our key informants especially, but not only, in our EU15 
countries, highlighted the confusion and contradictions embedded in processes of interpreting cross-
cutting national, transnational (between countries) and EU-level regulations, especially when these 
involved more than one institution. Regulatory lacunae and institutional gaps meant that specifying 
rights to portability even at quite abstract levels of legal entitlement could be difficult. This is 
perhaps best captured by what our AU/HU team called ‘grundsätzlichkeit’ –  the ‘in principle’ answer 
about entitlement, which  leaves actual entitlement in specific cases uncertain. Consequently the 
second level of discretion - of decision-makers at ‘street level’- was enhanced considerably above 
that which would already apply in cases of conditionality for nationals.  
 
As we saw in sections four and six above, the implications of these conditions will vary by categories 
of migrant status. In our case, we investigated the applicable conditions for one-time migrants from 
our EU8 to their EU15 partner country; returnees to the EU8 country, and the temporary/circular 
migrant who moves more than once between these two countries. In the presentation below, in 
order to better identify how relations of mobility, work and residence shape inclusion, exclusion and 
stratification between categories of migrant, we examine the conditionalities of access and 
portability by benefit, focusing on the implications for different categories of migrant in each case.  
 
In the process of our research, we found that in case of return migration (to our EU8 countries of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland), EU free movement restrictions on benefit access would 
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generally only apply in the first three months, although returnees might have to prove their ‘centre 
of life’ had reverted back to the country of origin. Our expert and key informant interviews in the 
EU8 countries did not problematize the application of EU requirements for returnees.21 
 
In the policy comparisons below, we focus therefore on  
a) how assemblages of regulatory conditions in the country pairs shape access and portability for 
one time migrants and returnees and  
b) how these assemblages of regulatory conditions in both countries, but especially the country of 
destination our EU15 countries), may affect temporary/circular migrants (ie those who return back 
to our destinations for more than one period of work or residence).    
 
7.2 Unemployment  
 
Unemployment insurance is directly regulated under EU law [883/2004 and EU citizens’ directive] 
but access to this benefit differs across countries. For one-time migrants with contributions, there 
were no reported regulatory issues with access or portability. The EU framework on entitlements for 
portability of unemployment insurance are rather clear (see sections 3.2, and 4.3.1). However, there 
are also national conditions such as length of contributions, length of residence, habitual residency 
test or “genuine chance of being engaged” test that regulate access to unemployment benefits. In 
particular, long and/or continuous contributions requirements can affect entitlement and therefore 
porting of benefits for returnee and circular migrants.  
 
For brevity, we use the following abbreviations for our cases: Bulgaria-Germany = BG/GE; Estonia-
Sweden = ES/SE; Hungary-Austria = HU/AU; Poland-UK = PL/UK. 
 
Table 7.1: Key regulatory conditions governing access & portability of selected cash benefits for 
unemployed in four EU transnational country-pairs 
 
Case  Unemployment benefits 
Bulgaria-Germany Long and continuous contributions for ALG I; high discretion for accessing ALGII 
Estonia-Sweden  procedural requirements are high but discretion is weak & short and flexible 
contributions are accepted 
Hungary-Austria procedural requirements are high, as is discretion. Short  and flexible contributions are 
accepted 
Poland-UK work for 12 months and pay enough contributions & have a genuine chance of finding 
‘genuine and effective work’ 
Source: TRANSWEL research teams and MISSOC 2015/6 
 
In both Sweden and Austria, procedural requirements are high but only in Sweden is discretion 
reported as weak, even in respect of unemployment insurance. Also, in Sweden and Austria short 
and flexible contributions are accepted, and there is good alignment with eligibility mechanisms of 
Estonia and Hungary, so that one-time migrants who lose their job, and circular migrants who move 
between countries are not so disadvantaged in these cases.  
 
                                                 
21 This still needs further interrogation. In addition, more detailed analysis of these interviews is also forthcoming work in 
TRANSWEL, led by Ann Runfors, Florence Fröhlig and Maarja Saar.  
  
In all cases except Sweden, where unemployment assistance is contributions-based, it is means-
tested and unavailable for one-time migrants upon arrival. In Germany highly discretionary decision-
making is observed (Arbeitslosenversicherung ALG II, which can not be ported) and in the UK, 
application for unemployment assistance is highly procedural and strongly discretionary as well as 
linked with other benefits. In contrast, in Estonia and Sweden discretion is weak, due its 
contributions-basis. 
 
Exploration of conditions showed several gateway conditions to unemployment benefits for EU 
mobile workers. In all countries the most significant is employment and contributions, especially of 
course for unemployment insurance. In addition, residency requirements in the UK, and Austria, act 
as gateways, while complex procedural requirements in Sweden might be significant, although a 
special organisation, IAF, has been launched to support migrants with this. For returnees, the length 
of absence is significant when accessing unemployment insurance upon return as their contributions 
made before they left must be recognised and returnees are subjected to the centre of life test in 
the country of origin.  In all countries returnees are more likely to be able to access this benefit if 
their absence was short and previous contributions were made over longer periods of time.  
 
Regarding returnees, in Bulgaria, no specific residence requirements were reported, and the 
contributions requirements are rather short and flexible, facilitating EU mobile citizens who are 
temporary/circular migrants, or in precarious work (if they return to Bulgaria). In Estonia, “the level 
of unemployment benefit is calculated by adding both the salary earned in the foreign country and 
in Estonia returnees will receive higher amounts than the rest of the population” (Runfors, Fröhlig 
and Saar, 2016). For unemployment insurance benefit, applicants must be in the Estonian population 
register as well as registered unemployed, also implies less significant residence requirements than 
in Sweden. Contributions requirements are rather quite long, but flexible (12 months contributions 
over 3 years), making it easier to access and port benefits for mobile workers who have interrupted 
contributions. In Hungary, returnees are eligible for unemployment insurance [Álláskeresési járadék] 
only if they earned their entitlement abroad and transferred it to Hungary for the period of three 
months. Returnees are not eligible for ‘employment substituting benefit’ [foglalkoztatást 
helyettesítő támogatás].  In the case of PL-UK, procedural requirements before returning can be 
unclear and this may create barriers to accessing contributions-based unemployment benefits in 
Poland.  
 
The Hungarian, Polish and Estonian cases also demonstrate some potential vulnerability of returnees 
who are unemployed, in relation to their access to healthcare. In Hungary, after the expiration of 
unemployment benefit, returnees are required to pay ‘flat-rate health care contribution’ and if 
unable to do so the local authority takes over the responsibility for their healthcare. In Poland and 
Estonia, returnees who are unemployed must register as such, even if they do not have an 
entitlement to unemployment benefit. Only those who do so (and their immediate family), are 
covered by health insurance, and thus have access to healthcare upon return. These requirements 
could represent important procedural obstacles to individuals’ and families’ healthcare cover if 
returning without regular employment. 
 
In sum, access to, and portability of unemployment insurance benefits is problematized via 
requirements for long and continuous contributions requirements (BG/GE), and in some cases by 
procedural conditions (Sweden), and residency requirements (Austria, UK). For retained workers and 
job-seekers with lower contributions (or who did not register their previous contributions from their 
employment in another member state), the higher conditionalities of unemployment assistance 
would be invoked (see section 4.3.2) 
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Consequently, all three group of migrants: 1) the one-time migrant; 2) the returnee and 3) the 
temporary (including circular) migrants may face short or long term vulnerabilities at destination 
upon arrival, or at the later stage of their migration history. Access to unemployment assistance in 
Germany (not portable) and even unemployment insurance in the HU/AU case is problematic for all 
three types of migrants due to the high discretion and complex administrative requirements. In turn, 
in Sweden although discretion is weak and short and flexible contributions are accepted procedural 
requirements are high (section 6.2). Overall, our research has not found significant regulatory 
barriers for returnees in accessing benefits (or receiving benefits ported from the previous country 
of migration). The Hungarian and Polish cases might however alert us to possible inequalities for 
unemployed returnees in relation to healthcare. 
 
7.3 Family benefits 
 
Our analysis of eligibility criteria exposed a complex matrix of conditionality to access family benefits 
transnationally, or port contributions. In our research we look at maternity leave, parental leave, 
parental leave plus associated benefits and child benefit. For family benefits, we discuss the 
situation of returnees in a separate sub-section below (section 7.3.5), rather than by benefit, due to 
the  (paradoxical) diversity of benefits, and common conditionalities which apply in our EU8 
‘sending’ countries. 
 
7.3.1 Maternity leave benefit 
Sweden does not have maternity leave, but subsumes all leave under parental leave, discussed 
below. In all our other cases, maternity leave [see table 7.2] is linked to the employment and/or 
length of contributions that has been made. Germany, Austria and the UK all provide a flat-rate 
benefit designed for mothers with lower incomes. While procedural requirements in Germany and 
the UK are low in terms of accessing maternity leave benefit, in Austria they are mid-level. To and 
from the UK, maternity leave benefit is not portable. 
 
In Germany access to and level of maternity allowance (Mutterschaftsgeld) varies as it is based on 
existing income from employment. Mutterschaftsgeld can be paid from first day of employment.  
Women insured through a private health insurance company, as well as women working ‘mini-jobs’ 
may receive a maximum one-time payment of €210. Individuals while choosing their health 
insurance may include maternity insurance, but they do not have to. 
 
In Austria maternity leave benefit (Wochengeld) constitutes an income substitution during the 
period of maternity protection when women are not allowed to work (usually 8 weeks before and 8 
weeks after giving birth) The level of maternity benefit is calculated individually on the basis of net 
income in the previous 13 weeks, and it is paid for duration of eight weeks before due date. Self-
employed women are entitled to a flat-rate benefit. Mothers in marginal employment and those in 
receipt of unemployment benefit are also entitled to Wochengeld but in the case of marginal 
employees it might be significantly lower. Wochengeld can be claimed from the first day of 
employment in Austria as previous insurance periods are recognised. Procedural requirements 
surrounding access to Wochengeld are mid-level. There are three conditions: employment at least 
one day in AT, certificate about pregnancy and calculated day of birth prior giving birth, after giving 
birth the birth certificate of the new-born. 
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Table 7.2. Key conditions governing portability of selected family benefits in four EU transnational 
country-pairs 
 
Case Maternity leave benefit Parental leave  
benefits 
Parental 
allowance 
Child benefit 
Bulgaria-
Germany 
based on existing income 
from employment 
Residency 
requirements 
N/A If both parents are entitled (in different 
countries), benefit can be paid by 
either country, providing that the 
second country will pay a supplement 
corresponding to the difference 
between the two benefits. The 
difference is not paid when the right to 
child benefits is only based on 
residence. 
Estonia 
Sweden 
N/A emphasis on 
residency & 
strong 
procedural 
requirements 
administered by 
municipality & 
highly procedural; 
institutional 
complexity 
high procedural requirements & parent 
residing in Sweden must have custody 
of (but need not reside with) the child. 
Where parents in each country have 
entitlement, benefit can be paid by 
either country, providing that the 
second country will pay a supplement 
corresponding to the difference 
between the two benefits 
Hungary-
Austria 
based on existing income 
from employment, mid-
level procedural 
requirements from the 
first day of employment 
in Austria 
N/A High procedural 
requirements 
given principle of 
equivalence  
mid-level procedural requirements, 
around residence 
Poland-UK long contributions & 
residency 
N/A N/A 3 months waiting period, children can 
reside with claimant or in another 
country, no ‘supplement’ where 
equivalent benefit is available.22 
Source: TRANSWEL research teams and MISSOC 2015/6 
 
 
Some similarities exist in the UK where there are also two types of maternity leave. An EU citizen is 
eligible for statutory maternity pay (SMP) if they worked for a single employer continuously for at 
least 26 weeks up to the ‘qualifying week’ (15th week before the expected week of childbirth). A 
lower level maternity allowance (SMA) is eligible for individuals who are also employed, with a lower 
contributions threshold for a shorter period (13 out of 66 weeks before the baby is due). Maternity 
allowance does not require employment with a single employer and so falls under portability 
regulations, but the amount of benefit is much lower than SMP, so that these effects disadvantage 
prospective and recent migrants who fall pregnant: by either excluding them from benefit or by 
assigning them to the lower SMA benefit. Access to both benefits is not discretionary and procedural 
requirements are straightforward.  
 
                                                 
22 In 2016, PL introduced a new child benefit, which intersects in interesting ways with UK child benefit (e.g. in relation to 
levels of benefit for child 1, 2, 3). Full exploration of this remains outside the scope of this comparative paper.  
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Accessing maternity leave by EU mobile mothers can be problematic. In the three ‘receiving’ 
countries of our study that provide maternity leave, all categories of pregnant or new mother mobile 
workers are faced with class-based vulnerabilities at destination. This is more evident in Austria and 
the UK, with their requirements for preceding 6 months of contributions. However, while in Austria 
insurance periods in other EU MS are recognised, following Regulation 883/2004, in the PL/UK case, 
income-based maternity pay is not portable, further increasing likelihood of receiving the lower level 
benefit.  
 
Thus, all categories of mobile EU pregnant workers may access maternity leave in our relevant three 
country-pair cases (ie excluding ES/SE). However, the conditionality attached to contributions may 
imply a gendering (and additional socio-economic inequality) effect on migration experiences for 
Hungarian mothers in Austria and Polish mothers in the UK (see ‘parental leave’ for discussion of 
SE/EE case).  
 
7.3.2 Parental leave plus associated benefits  
There is no functional equivalent of parental leave [Table 5] in Austria or the UK.  
 
In Germany Elterngeld is paid for up to 14 months from the date of birth of the child. The recipient(s) 
must be ordinarily resident in Germany and live in the same household as the child. EU citizens are 
eligible for Elterngeld if they are employed, self-employed, housewives/husbands or students. The 
benefit is calculated based on the net income of the applicant in the twelve months prior to the birth 
of a child. If the parent is in receipt of unemployment insurance benefit, or had no other prior 
income, they are entitled to the minimum Elterngeld of 300 euros per month (providing they meet 
the residence criteria). 
 
In Sweden, earnings-related parental leave benefit is contributions based, while the flat rate 
parental leave is a residency-based benefit. An EU-national parent who resides with a child in 
Sweden is eligible to this latter benefit; contributions are not required. This benefit is paid until child 
turns eight years of age or finishes year one in school. 
 
In both cases, the emphasis on residency suggests relatively straightfoward access to benefit at least 
at the minimum level. However, in practice, access may be challenging due to discretionary 
requirements (proving centre of life), notably for receipt of the flat-rate parental allowances. 
 
7.3.3 Parental allowance (child-rearing benefits) 
In Germany parental allowance (Betreuungsgeld - child rising benefit), was abolished from 1st of 
August 2015 and no replacement was introduced. In Sweden child allowance is administered by the 
local municipality but in 2015 this benefit is not provided in Stockholm where this research is based. 
There is no parental allowance [Table 5] in the UK. 
 
In Austria there are two types of parental allowances. The first is Kinderbetreuungsgeld, a universal 
benefit not linked with employment. Generally, for this benefit children are required to live in the 
same household as applicant in Austria, but for EU citizens it is possible to apply for 
Kinderbetreuungsgeld on behalf of children residing abroad in certain cases23. This is the case when 
one parent works in Austria and the other is inactive and lives with the child in the other EU country. 
This benefit can be paid for up to 3 years.  
 
                                                 
23 Policy experts highlighted the importance of the parent and child being legally resident in an EU country, passing 
mother-child examinations, and having centre of vital interest in the country of portability. 
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The second type is income-based Kinderbetreuungsgeld which is linked with minimum six months 
contributions immediately prior to the birth of the child. This benefit is administered by the social 
insurance institutions and its duration is limited to 12-months (if one parent claims) and 14 months if 
both claim. The applicant must have employment subject to Austrian social insurance in the last 6 
months prior to giving birth (in certain cases, the insurance periods can be accumulated according to 
the EU regulation.) In the Austrian case, gateway conditions for accessing parental allowance are 
strictly linked with parents’ and child’ residency, although it is portable in certain cases, it is highly 
procedural and the income-based benefit is subject to institutional complexity because 
Kinderbetreuungsgeld is organised by the different social insurance institutions. The combination of 
requirements and with middle to high discretionary barriers (depending on the benefit and 
insurance institution) can problematize access to this benefit for migrants. 
 
7.3.4 Child benefit 
In Germany, Austria and the UK, EU migrants need to acquire habitual residency before making a 
claim for child benefit, while in Sweden such a claim can be made at the point of entry.   
 
Kindergeld in Germany is not income-based and can be claimed until the children turn 18, or 25 if 
they are in full-time education. Kindergeld can be claimed on behalf of the children who reside in 
other Member States. If claimed in the child’s country of residence the amount that they receive is 
deducted from the amount received in Germany. If the benefit they receive is more than the 
Kindergeld then the claim in Germany will not be eligible.  
 
EU citizens are entitled to child benefit in Sweden if the child resides with them, or in another EU 
country. This benefit can be claimed from first day of residency in Sweden and it can be obtained 
from the time of the child’s birth until 16 years of age or longer if they remain in education.  
 
In Austria child benefit (Familienbeihilfe) is provided for permanent and habitual residents and it can 
be claimed on behalf of children who live abroad and its duration lasts until child is 18 years of age 
or 25 years of age if in education. Access to Familienbeihilfe is problematized via procedural 
requirements, especially proof of residency. 
 
In the UK person is eligible for a child benefit is he or she is responsible for a child under 16 or under 
20 if in approved education or training. This benefit is also available for an EU citizen who works in 
the UK, and is responsible for a child who does not reside in in the UK, providing that no other 
benefits are claimed on behalf of this child in the country of their residence. The benefit is subject to 
‘claw-back’ above a certain level of individual income.  
 
In sum, while the EU regulatory framework for portability of child benefit is relatively 
straightforward, habitual or other residency requirements may problematize these in practice, 
especially for circular/temporary migrants. In most cases, due to differences in benefit levels, it 
would have generally been advantageous for transnational families to claim child benefit, by the 
parent living in an EU15 member state. However, both CJEU jurisprudence, which permits ‘top ups’, 
and the tightening of domestic rules to confine child benefit to co-resident children, mean that 
“equal treatment” for transnational families of EU migrants is contingent on the country of 
residence of both parent and child, rather than a right. This is well illustrated by a short presentation 
of the situation of returnees’ access to family benefits in our EU8 countries in our next sub-section. 
 
7.3.5 Family benefits for returnees in the TRANSWEL country-pairs 
Mobile EU citizens returning to Bulgaria can face challenges in transferring family benefits due to 
different approaches to data collection and in establishing entitlement. Questions of who or what is 
a family also complicate the process of establishing rights.  ‘Some family benefits in Bulgaria are 
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means-tested, but German family benefit offices do not collect data on claimants’ incomes, which 
can pose difficulties for migrants returning to Bulgaria wanting to prove eligibility for benefits. 
Differences in definition of ‘family’ leads to difficulties in determining whether individuals are 
entitled to receive family benefits, and in which country’ (Amelina et al. 2016a). 
 
There is no childrearing benefit in Estonia and child benefit is residency based. Consequently, child 
benefit is accessible for all returnees, but this is rather a question of access, rather than portability. 
For parental leave, returnees must have been either living or working in Estonia for the whole 
previous year, or must be registered as a resident of Estonia, while working in another EU state. This 
means that in case of Estonia access to parental leave is quite flexible, contributions made in a 
second member state are recognised, abroad, and even unemployed returnees may be eligible for 
parental leave. Our key informants did report, that similarly to our BG/GE case, definitional 
differences of eligibility and ‘family’ could make portability of benefits for difficult for transnational 
families to access.  
 
In Hungary, by contrast, the conditions of access to family benefits are predominantly related to 
contributions: maternity benefit [Terhességi-gyermekágyi segély, TGYAS], infant care allowance 
[CSED] and Child Care Fee [Gyermekgondozási díj], each require at least 365 insured days in the last 
2 years. Regulation 883/2004 permits portability through the accumulation of social insurance 
contributions made in other member states (in our case Austria, with similar social insurance-based 
benefits), and the contributions requirements are relatively flexible (if also relatively long). We might 
therefore expect returnees, and more mobile migrant workers in Hungary should not face very 
significant barriers to generating and access their entitlements to family benefits. All returnees may 
access family allowance [Családi pótlék], a universal provision in Hungary.  
 
Most family benefits in Poland are means-tested and may be claimed by people – including 
returnees - who reside within Poland for the period for which they will receive the benefits and their 
family income does not exceed PLN 539.00 per calendar month. Recently a new type of child-rearing 
benefit, Rodzina 500 plus [Family 500 +] was introduced. It is hybrid of means-tested and residency 
based family benefits. It is means-tested for the first child, and residency-based for the second and 
subsequent children.   
 
7.4 Health Insurance  
 
Similarly to pensions, the combination of EU legislation and our transnational country pair 
regulations on healthcare insurance appear less problematic and less complex than for 
unemployment, or family benefits. This is especially relevant in relation to the EHIC card. However, 
the EHIC card is designed exclusively for emergency health treatments and thus does not cover 
access to healthcare per se. In addition, EHIC is also time-limited and can be used only for the 3 
initial months period, past which an EU mobile citizen need to gain additional access to healthcare 
(see section 4.3.3).  
 
In our BG/GE and HU/AU cases, health insurance is accessed with employment, and eligibility applies 
from the first day of employment in the country of origin and destination. For returnees to Bulgaria, 
and temporary/circular migrants, however, three years contributions are required, in order to 
continue health insurance coverage, with no more than three monthly missing payments. As 
discussed in section 7.2 (unemployment benefits) returnees to Hungary must be employed in order 
to access health insurance. Unemployed returnees are covered by health insurance while in receipt 
of unemployment benefits. 
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In Sweden EU migrants who are in insured employment can receive healthcare, even without a PIN, 
although they will need a ‘certificate of residence’ in Sweden. Although this certificate represents a 
procedural condition, it should enable EU workers on short-term stays to have access to healthcare. 
However, for those mobile citizens with more precarious employment and higher levels of mobility, 
access to healthcare is secured with the ‘centre of life’ and intention to settle (securing a PIN), or by  
having comprehensive health insurance.24 In Estonia, for health insurance an employment contract is 
needed, with exceptions for children, retired, students, people on parental leave and unemployed. 
All other returnees need to have private health insurance, or register as unemployed.   
 
Poland also has an insurance-based system, but in the UK access to healthcare is subject to residency 
rather than employment. In practice in the UK a rather minimal threshold for residency or 
procedural requirement for proof of residency is established. Returnees to Poland, similarly to 
Estonia, and as discussed in section 7.2, must be insured or registered unemployed, even if with no 
right to unemployment benefit. 
 
Table 7.3: Key regulatory conditions governing portability of sickness, health insurance and 
healthcare in four EU transnational country-pairs 
 
Case Health insurance Sickness insurance 
Bulgaria-Germany residency and employment choice of health insurance 
Estonia-Sweden Employment or centre of life and intention 
to settle 
employment 
Hungary-Austria residency and employment choice of health insurance 
Poland-UK Residency and employment earning threshold 
Source: TRANSWEL research, 2015/6 
 
 
In all countries sickness insurance is of course linked with employment and insurance contributions 
but varies significantly. In Germany and Austria there is emphasis is on a choice of health insurance. 
Individuals can choose type of sickness insurance when assigning for particular health insurance 
coverage. In Germany, sickness insurance applies from day one of employment, but returnees to 
Bulgaria would need to have ported previous contributions from Germany, as six months 
contributions in Bulgaria or other Member State are required there. The case of ES/SE is unusual in 
our four country-pair cases. In Sweden it is possible to accumulate insured periods of sickness 
insurance from other member states, but if one did not work previously at all there is a need for an 
individual to express their intention to stay in Sweden for over a year.  
 
Overall, access to health and sickness insurance varies by country-pair case, but with similar possible 
vulnerabilities for returnees in three of our four cases. For mobile citizens without employment, 
return to our EU8 countries may present important barriers to securing appropriate healthcare 
cover.  
                                                 
24 Requirements as permitted by the ‘Citizens’’ Directive 2004/38, see section 3.1 above. 
 53 
 
 
7.5 Pensions 
 
Access and portability of pensions is relatively straightforward, at least in terms of regulatory fit – 
both transnationally between our EU8 and EU15 countries, and with the assumptions of the EU 
framework discussed in section three. This is mainly because EU Regulation on free movement was 
originally designed to protect migrant workers who are in full-time employment over the long-term.  
Thus, unlike other benefits, portability of pensions appears as the most straightforward, as pension 
contributions fall into the classic conceptualisation of portability, where contributions in one public 
pension scheme are recognised in another in a second member state. However, there are 
differences in length of contributions required in order to be able to make a claim. Although 
Germany has no direct residency requirements there is a need for at least five years contributions 
for entitlement although following SSP rules from EU regulation means that Bulgarian contributions 
can be added to those made in Germany. In the case of UK there is a need for one year contributions 
and three years residency. The Austrian case is exceptional as there is a need for merely one day 
contribution, while in Sweden residency of at least one year is most important for provision of 
(residency-based) basic state pension. Therefore, gateways to pension are structured around length 
of contributions and residency.  
 
While in Germany EU citizens can claim pension after contributing to the German insurance for at 
least five years and in Austria EU citizens may apply for pension if they reach pension age and 
worked in Austria for at least a day. In Sweden EU citizen may apply for GARP (basic state pension) 
based on residency. Eligibility for GARP can be earned with three years residency but if claimant has 
lived in Sweden for less than three years his or hers residency in another EU country will be 
acknowledged. However, for income-based pension (IP and PREP), the criteria of length of residency 
are not relevant but relevant levels of contributions. In the UK EU citizens can claim State Pension if 
they reach State Pension age, they have been working for at least a year in the UK, and they have 
resided there for at least three years. Contributions from other EU countries may be incorporated 
into their pension. However, circular migrants, although their periods of insurance can be 
accumulated may face some vulnerability and loss of benefits related to the differences between the 
pensions systems between which he or she is moving.  
 
Table 7.4. Key regulatory conditions governing portability of selected old-age public pensions in 
four EU transnational country-pairs 
 
Case Statutory contributory public pensions 
Bulgaria-Germany no direct residency requirement but five years contributions 
Estonia-Sweden residency of at least one year 
Hungary-Austria one day contributions 
 
Poland-UK contributions & three years residency 
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7.6 Summary 
 
Across our four country pairs, in contributory state pensions, EU migrants’ access to, and portability of, 
social security were reported as straightforward and well-understood in practice for all cases. In other 
policy areas, a number of barriers to access and portability were identified, although there was variation 
among country-pair cases, as well as by benefit. In unemployment benefits, our research identified 
procedural conditions, high levels of discretion and regulatory complexity as barriers to access and 
portability of entitlements. For family benefits, social security system differences, and diversity of 
welfare regulations, were the main factors which can create barriers to access and portability of 
entitlements. In health, complexity, cost, and procedural requirements for securing appropriate 
insurance could, in different cases, present barriers to adequate healthcare cover, particularly in 
insurance-based health systems. These barriers may present a significant social risk to migrants if they 
do not have healthcare cover after the first three months of residence.  
 
From a migrant perspective, we can observe that the extensive interlocking of individual eligibility 
criteria for all benefit types problematize access to, and portability of, specific social security rights. This 
complex variation of interlocking eligibility criteria is problematized further by strong discretionary, and 
high procedural requirements.  As a result of these complexities we can observe that long-term 
migrants, who are in uninterrupted employment are more likely to freely exercise their social security 
rights in the country of migration. Short-term, temporary and circular migrants whose access to rights is 
problematized by their short-term residency status and discontinued contributions. Consequently, the 
EU mobile citizen, imagined as a flexible and mobile worker at the heart of EU free movement, is in 
practice free to move, and has rights to work, but may not generate entitlements to social security. The 
close analysis of eligibility conditions shows that one-time/long-term migrants are in the most 
favourable position when discussing EU mobile citizens’ access to social security rights. In other words, 
EU mobile citizens who are less mobile and choose rather sedentarist way of living in the country of 
destination benefit the most from the coordination of social security rights in the EU. In the next section 
we explore the mechanisms which produce these dynamics of mobility, work and residence, and their 
implications for inclusion/exclusion and stratification. 
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VIII Re-conceptualising portability of social security in the EU: from formal 
regulations to portability governance  
 
8.1 Dimensions of social security portability governance: interpreting gateway conditions for mobile 
‘economically active’ citizens 
 
Our investigation exposed that the co-existence of EU and national regulatory requirements for mobile 
EU workers to secure their social security rights has created regulatory and institutional complexity. This 
co-existence has shed light on barriers to access and portability of social security. Analysis exposed three 
main gateways for portability of social security rights: 
 
• Residency: co-existence of national and EU residency rules, generating contradictory requirements  
• Employment/contributions: social security system differences matter – between member states 
and regarding ‘institutional fit’ with the assumptions of EU regulatory framework. 
• Operational conditions: procedural requirements, institutional complexity & administrative 
discretion 
 
The interplay between these gateways differs across county-pair cases, and benefit types. However, the 
comparative results exposed conditions at the national level that guard access to social benefits, and 
thus shape the governance of SSP. Examining in these in more detail shows us that even straightforward 
aspects of national social security regulations – like length of contributions for entitlement to 
unemployment insurance, for example, can become rather treacherous for the mobile worker. This is 
even more the case where the mobile worker is also precariously employed. 
 
First is residency [Figure 2], which is a key gateway to portability.  It can be tested to greater (SE/SE, 
HU/AU, PL/UK) or lesser (BG/GE) degree. It also depends on benefit type, with pensions, unemployment 
insurance and health insurance benefits least likely to be strongly conditional on residence (except in 
HU/AU). Thus, residency requirements on the one hand act as gateway to, and on the other as barrier to 
portability of social security rights as some rights cannot be effortlessly portable but need to be earned 
by acquiring habitual residence (e.g. unemployment assistance, some family benefits).   
 
Figure 8.1. Interplay of residency conditions between member states and EU regulatory framework 
governing social security portability  
  
  Source: authors’ own elaboration 
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The more of these residence conditions that apply in any one case, and the longer the period of 
residence that is required, the more temporary migrants and more mobile migrants (including those 
with more experience of irregular employment) are likely to be excluded from both access and then 
portability of social security. The exclusionary logic here is oriented to sedentarism, and limits to 
mobility, with stratifying effects for the most precariously employed and the most mobile migrants. 
 
Frequently incorporation into the host country’s welfare system not only involves specifying – and 
proving – a period of residency but also contributions linked with employment. Portability of some social 
security rights may permit recognition of previous contributions from another welfare systems but for 
most of them they have to be made in the countries of destination. Thus, second important gateway to 
portability are contributions [Figure 3], their length as well as continuity, and the thresholds at which 
contributions are payable. Continuity of contributions is of particular importance for the EU mobile 
citizens as if facilitates greater flexibility and possibly accumulation of contributions over time and 
across different welfare systems. Importantly access to certain benefit may be limited by introduction of 
earnings thresholds which often acts as a gateway to portability as well25.  Earnings thresholds as a 
measure to limit access to social benefits are important when discussing mobile citizens as often they 
worked in low-paid employment and therefore do not meet required thresholds, especially where these 
thresholds are used to determine migrants’ legal status as ‘retained workers’, ‘jobseekers’ or ‘EU 
nationals’ (see section 3.2).  
 
Figure 8.2. Interplay of employment and contributions conditions between member states and EU 
regulatory framework governing social security portability  
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
 
 
The longer and more continuous contributions required, the more that our combined EU and national 
SSP regulation exhibit an assumption of inclusion around the model EU ‘worker’, fulfilling the ideal-
typical full-time regular employment role.  
 
Furthermore, for EU migrants, the question of being in formal, regular, non-precarious employment is 
not just a question of ‘making contributions’, unlike for nationals. The role of employment history, 
quality, length, and pay radically shape EU migrants’ legal status and therefore their ability to generate 
entitlements, and cut across residency requirements (e.g. in proving centre of life, intention to settle, or 
ability to reside in a member state “without recourse to public funds”. Thus if we consider the 
intersection of the EU framework and domestic rules, we can see that those migrants with fragmented 
employment records, due to unemployment or caring activities, and those in precarious employment, 
                                                 
25 See footnote on methodological difficulties in generating comparable data on thresholds; future publications on this strand 
of TRANSWEL work will seek to incorporate empirical analysis of thresholds.  
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which do not conform to the notional (and often implicit or informal) ‘ideal-type’ of employment face 
difficulties in generating entitlements, in securing access and also in portability of their social security 
rights.  
 
Provision of benefits is problematized further by the high procedural and strong discretionary 
reguirements [Figure 4] that constitute our third gateway to the portability of social security rights and 
may involve activities in countries of migration and emigration. Procedural requirements include, but 
are not limited to, intricate registration procedures, identification numbers procurement, supply of 
documents that proves centre of life and intentions to settles, attendance at special meetings, 
workshops, medical tests etc. Discretion reflects on the important role that decision makers at the 
administrative level play in a provision of benefits. Regulations on access to social security rights are 
often ambiguous, thus decision making process may be strongly discretionary and decision are made on 
a case-by-case basis.  
 
Figure 8.3 Interplay of operational conditions between member states and EU regulatory framework 
governing social security portability  
 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
 
The operational conditions identified here have strongly exclusionary and stratifying logics against 
mobility. In all our cases, complex procedural requirements and institutional arrangements function to 
enhance the residence conditions which are established in the intersection of EU and national welfare 
system regulations. Migrants who move more often are positioned as exceptional cases in welfare 
systems. Being positioned in this way means that they become subject to greater degrees of discretion 
among decision-makers, which increases the ambiguity of their access to and portability of social 
security and as procedural burdens of proof (e.g. documentary evidence of employment, centre of life, 
attachment to the labour market) increase in such cases, the more mobile migrant has both less 
oversight of what their legal position is (how they can generate entitlements? What are their 
entitlements) and is subject to more regulatory intervention and scrutiny.  
 
 
8.2  A dynamic conceptualisation of portability governance: gateway conditions in action 
 
As we saw in section two above, currently portability is perceived/understood as a linear process [Figure 
1]. We challenge this linear dimension of portability as our close exploration of conditionality and 
gateways to access of social security benefits shows more dynamic dimension of access and portability 
[Figure 5]. As shown this dynamic dimension of portability is a result of EU and member states 
regulations that govern access to and portability of social security rights.  
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Figure 8.4 A dynamic conceptualisation of social security portability governance between member 
states and EU regulation 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
 
 
This conceptualisation is dynamic and moving and we expect that this will directly affect the migrant 
who experiences it – and may move differently depending which benefit you applying for, even in the 
same transnational country-pair. The cog metaphor is also designed to show the interlocking and mutual 
dependence of these gateway conditions, which can easily crush the migrant themselves. 
 
It is this conceptualisation which also enables us to see that although the EU provides a represents a 
densely regulated domain, designed to facilitate SSP, in fact, the way in which EU and national 
regulations are enmeshed together in specific cases can prevent migrants from generating entitlements, 
let alone accessing or porting them in a linear fashion. 
 
8.3  Inclusion, exclusion and stratification in EU portability governance 
 
As we have seen above, access to social security and portability of social security rights is often highly 
conditional, For this research three main migrant categories were identified: the one-time migrant, the 
returnee and the temporary (including the circular) migrant as the analytically relevant criteria. As 
pointed out previously individual conditions such as residency, contributions and operational conditions 
affect an individual’s access to social rights and the sum of these conditions disclosure extent to which 
portability of social rights is enabled or limited.   
 
The temporary/circular migrant is particularly significant analytical criteria as exploration of conditions 
under which this type of migrant might experience portability exposes whether different regulations 
have systematic logics of inclusion or exclusion, but moreover provides an overview of portability of 
social security rights as the central element of transnational multi-scale welfare in the enlarged 
European Union. 
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Empirical analysis shows that regulations have specific assumptions regarding inclusion or exclusion for 
circular migrants. These assumptions vary by country and/or policy area and circular migrants’ inclusion 
and exclusion is constructed mainly around residency and contribution requirements. The longer the 
time that circular migrant spent outside of the country of immigration [for example as a returnee in the 
country of origin] the more discretionary access to social security rights becomes. Further circular 
migrants with long length of previous residency and contributions, alongside with short absence are 
more likely to exercise their social security rights upon return. More mobile migrants may also risk their 
ability to secure ‘habitual residency’ in either member state. Circular migrants may find that previous 
residency and/or contributions are unrecognized and in practice they have to re-establish their position 
within welfare state of the country of destination..  
 
The regulatory and institutional complexity, and degree of discretion affecting access and portability of 
benefits (apart from EHIC and pensions) in three ES/SE, HU/AU and PL/UK of our four country pairs is 
likely to favour educated and better-off migrants who can master the system more easily, and 
disadvantage those with less access to information, lower language skills, in short term or temporary 
employment, and those who are more mobile between the two countries. 
 
Evidence from this research shows that portability of social security rights does not endorse or facilitate 
mobility per se, but rather shapes free movement for the purpose of settled employment. Thus, complex 
migration trajectories, such as those of temporary migrants, limit access to social benefits and 
consequently problematize their portability of social rights. SSP as a feature of transnational welfare in 
the enlarged European Union, may enable individuals working as an employee (or looking for 
employment), working as a self-employed person, studying, being self-sufficient or retired to exercise 
their treaty rights across EU countries. It does not facilitate ‘enhanced mobility’. Consequently, the 
regulation on portability at the EU and national levels promote sendentarist model of rights, which fits 
with the need for use of migration to satisfy labour demand.  The free movement and coordination of 
social security rights assists merely in easier incorporation of EU migrants into the welfare systems of 
countries of immigration. 
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IX Conclusions: thinking transnationally about portability governance: some 
empirical and analytical observations 
 
• How are migrants’ social security rights structured transnationally in regulations?  
• How do welfare systems’ conditionalities organize, condition, and set limits to the acquisition 
and portability of social security rights? 
 
The barriers to access and portability identified in our research have practical effects. They embed 
contingent selectivity in social security portability regulations. Dynamic relations of mobility, work and 
residence are jointly produced in the interplay between the EU regulatory framework and member 
states (Carmel 2013, Carmel and Paul 2013). We can make two key empirical observations. 
 
From a policy perspective, this ‘joint production’ means that EU regulations, framed and designed to 
support social rights for mobile workers, while also promoting flexible and responsive labour markets do 
not meet these policy goals. Our results show that these EU regulations, embedded in the unequal 
political economy of increasingly flexible labour markets, are used by member states to secure 
‘sedentarist’ and exclusionary logics of access and portability of social security. As a result, the mobile 
EU person that is privileged in this jointly produced regulation is the regularly employed, one-time and 
long-term migrant. The flexible, mobile worker, especially in lower-skill employment, who is supposedly 
oiling the wheels of EU economic growth, is more likely than their less mobile counterparts, to find 
themselves excluded from, rather than included in, access and portability. And the very characteristics 
of EU legislation itself – especially the residency tests - provides a major contribution to explaining this 
result.  
 
From a migrant perspective, we can also observe that this ‘joint production’ of interlocking – and often 
contradictory - regulations are adopted, insitutionalised and interpreted in our transnational cases in 
ways which are so complex that they cause barriers and blockages of themselves. This complexity must 
be negotiated by both decision-makers and mobile citizens, and leads to uncertainty, and 
misunderstandings among decision-makers. This is especially notable in the transnational cases of 
HU/AU, ES/SE and PL/UK, and especially affects benefits for people of working age. The phase of 
research for TRANSWEL reported on there did not directly examine migrants’ experiences of access and 
portability; the project will be reporting results on this in 2016 (quantitative survey) and 2017 
(qualitative interviews). However, given the contested and contradictory characteristics of regulatory 
conditions reported by key informants and policy experts, our research so far raises concerns about 
whether even relatively well-resourced and socially embedded migrants can fully access their social 
security ‘rights’. 
 
We can make three further observations with conceptual implications. First, we have shown the limits of 
existing definitions of portability in the literature. Such definitions have taken for granted (or ignored) 
the complexity of conditions which shape access to and portability of social security. In this paper we 
have developed a more elaborate and nuanced conceptualization of portability, which reflects how co-
existing and jointly produced conditions shape this aspect of EU workers’ social rights. This 
conceptualization draws attention to the interlocking characteristics of social security portability 
regulation, and the need to account for legal conditions, but also for administrative regulations and 
administrative practices in shaping migrants’ social security.  
 
Second, that EU social ‘rights’ remains something of a distant dream, even for this institutionally and 
legally privileged group of migrants – the EU citizen (worker). The degree of discretion which is either 
formally required (e.g. in tests of ‘genuine and effective work’ in the UK, or of ‘intentions to settle in 
Sweden) or which is produced by institutional complexity (e.g. in co-existence of multiple definitions of 
residency – which to choose? - in Austria), demonstrates that there are no ‘rights’ to social security and 
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portability, except in two specific and important cases. First, in the case of pensions – which suits the 
regularly employed long-term migrant for whom social security co-ordination was first imagined. Second 
in the case of emergency health, the case of EHIC: the key instance of an European (EU-wide) social 
right. Its limitations remain profound – covering emergency care, not healthcare in general, the EHIC is 
also time-limited. Even if in practice the 3-month limit on using EHIC is not easy to enforce, the very 
existence of this short-term limit highlights the more general rule: in order to be a ‘proper’ EU citizen 
(see Anderson 2013, Soysal 2012), you need to first, move, but then you need to stay, settle in a national 
state.  
 
Third, that who is to be included, the favoured ‘European’ remains oriented around specific privileges 
for a particular ‘ideal-type’ of worker – this worker is skilled, in regular employment, might be a man or 
a woman, but above all should be settled or long-term. So on the one hand, we have EU policies, 
directives and regulations promoted as assisting workers’ mobility (notably to promote ‘flexible’ and 
‘innovative’ economic growth), and on the other, this EU regulation is used by member states to exclude 
the most mobile citizens and the more vulnerable workers from entitlement to claim social security as 
they move across borders in the EU. This is being done at precisely the time when such mobile and 
precarious workers are becoming more significant the political economy of the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANNEX 1 FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS BY POLICY AREA AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY 
 
 
  
Types of benefits UK-PL DE-BG AT-HU SE-ES 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Unemployment insurance 
[contributions based] 
Zasiłek dla bezrobotnych Обезщетение за пълна 
безработица 
Álláskeresési járadék Töötuskindlustushuvitis 
Unemployment assistance Pomoc spłeczna Частична или временна 
безработица 
Foglalkoztatást helyettesítő 
támogatás 
Töötutoetus 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
Sickness insurance benefit Zasiłek chorobowy Парични обезщетения по 
болест 
Táppénz Töövõimetushüvitis 
Health insurance Ubezpieczenie zdrowotne 
[NFZ] 
Задължително здравно 
осигуряване 
Egészségügyi szolgáltatási 
járulék 
 
Tervisekindlustus/haigekassa 
PENSION 
Old age pension Emerytura  Öregségi nyugdíj Vanaduspension 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
Maternity benefits [leave] Zasiłek macierzyński Обезщетение за бременност 
и раждане 
Terhességi-gyermekágyi segély 
(TGYÁS) 
Sünnitushüvitis 
Parental leave plus associated 
benefits 
‘Urlop tacierzyński’ родителски отпуск и други 
семейни помощи и 
обезщетения 
Gyermekgondozási díj Vanemahüvitis 
Parental allowance [Child 
rearing benefit] 
Zasiłek wychowawczy Обезщетение за отглеждане 
на малко дете 
Gyermekgondozási segély Lapsehooldustasu 
Child benefit Zasiłek rodzinny Месечно обезщетение за 
отглеждане на дете до 
завършване на средно 
образование, 
но не повече от 20-годишна 
възраст 
 
Családi pótlék 
 
Lapsetoetus 
Functional equivalents of entitlements for EU8 TRANSWEL countries 
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Types of benefits UK-PL DE-BG AT-HU SE-ES 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Unemployment insurance  Contribution-based JSA Arbeitslosengeld I [ALG I] Arbeitslosengeld inkomstbortfallsförsäkring 
 
Unemployment assistance Income-based JSA Arbeitslosengeld II [ALG II] Notstandshilfe grundförsäkring 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
Sickness insurance benefit Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) Krankengeld Krankengeld sjukpenning 
Health insurance NHS Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung 
Krankenversicherung Hälso- och sjukvård i Sverige 
PENSION 
Old age pension The basic State Pension Compulsory old age  Gesetzliche 
Pensionsversicherung 
Allmän pension 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
Maternity benefits [leave] Maternity Allowance 
Statutory maternity pay (SMP) 
Mutterschaftsgeld Wochengeld Graviditetspenning 
Parental leave plus associated 
benefits 
N/A Elterngeld  
Elternurlaub  
N/A Föräldraledighet 
Parental allowance [Child 
rearing benefit] 
N/A N/A  Kindetbetreuungsgeld 
Einkommensabhaengiges 
Kinderbetreuungsgeld 
Kommunalt vårdnadsbidrag 
Child benefit Child benefit Kindergeld Familienbeihilfe Barnbidrag 
Functional equivalents of entitlements for the EU15 TRANSWEL countries  
  
ANNEX 2: SAMPLE TABLE TO COMPARE WELFARE CONDITIONALITIES ON SSP FOR THREE CATEGORIES OF MIGRANT 
Category 1 – one time migrant  Category 2 – the returnee  Category 3 – circular migrant     
a. resident 
less than 3 
months, with 
earned 
entitlements 
in country of 
origin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assessing 
entitlement 
from 
portability 
from country 
of origin] 
b.  
resident less 
than 3 
months, with 
no 
entitlements 
earned in 
country of 
origin  
 
 
 
 
 
assessing 
entitlement in 
country of 
destination 
c.  
1 
year 
d.  
3 
years 
e.  
5 
years  
a.  
resident less than 3 
months, having 
earned entitlements 
in country of 
migration for less 
than 12 months  
 
 
 
 
 
 
entitlement from 
short-term  portability 
from country of 
migration 
b.  
resident less 
than 3 months, 
having earned 
entitlement in 
country of 
migration for 
more than 12 
months  
 
 
 
 
entitlement 
from long-term  
portability from 
country of 
migration 
c.  
resident less 
than 3 months, 
with no 
entitlements 
earned in 
country of 
migration  
 
 
 
 
 
treatment of 
mobility where 
portability does 
not apply 
d.  
resident less 
than 3 months, 
having earned 
entitlement in 
country of 
migration for 
more than 5 
years.  
 
 
 
 
entitlement 
from EU-
regulated 
permanent 
residency from 
country of 
migration 
a.  
Returning 
after 3 
months in 
country of 
origin [no 
entitlements 
earned], and 
with previous 
migration/con
tributions of 3 
years. 
b.  
Returning 
after 3 
months in 
country of 
origin [no 
entitlement
s earned] 
and 
previous 
migration of 
12 months 
c.  
Returning after 
12 months in 
country of 
origin [12 mths 
contributions 
made], and with 
previous 
residence in 
country of 
migration of 3 
years.  
d. Returning 
after 3 
months in 
country of 
origin [no 
entitlement
s earned], 
and with 
previous 
migration/c
ontributions 
of 5 years 
e.  
Returning 
after 12 
months in 
country of 
origin [12 
mths 
contribution
s made], 
and with 
previous 
residence in 
country of 
migration of 
5 years.  
BENEFIT IN 
COUNTRY 
PAIR CASE 
             
 ANNEX 3: CRITERIA FOR WEIGHTING CONDITIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL TABLES 
 
EU REGULATORY/LEGAL BASIS 
 
1. Clarity and extent of contention about the EU –regulation of right to portability  
a. Generous 
b. Limited 
c. None (no EU regulated right) 
 
- The entire TRANSWEL project is premised on an investigation into the EU as a ‘portability rights’-granting 
domain, starting from the assumption that portability can be understood sociologically as a regime 
comprising several elements (regulations, discourses, practices), which each interact to shape social 
inequalities as a result. 
- ‘Generous’ means that the right is clear, specific, and offers a distinct set of rights. 
- ‘Limited’ means that there are portability rights established in EU policy/regulation, but these might be 
time-limited, or subject to ambiguity meaning that they can be limited in particular cases. 
- ‘None’ means that we believe that there is no clear and direct regulation of portability at EU level. 
 
 
RESIDENCY 
 
2. Subject to habitual residency/centre of life – test  
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
- The HR test is in most cases a key ‘condition’ to portability for EU migrants, although it is tested to a greater or 
lesser degree for different categories of migrant and we suspect also that it is tested with a greater or lesser 
degree of specificity (and demands) in different countries. 
 
3. Length of residence 
 
a. Very short (> 3 months) 
b. Short (3-5 months) 
c. Medium (6-11 months) 
d. Long (12mths-4 years) 
e. Permanent (5 years or more) 
 
- Residency was a key criteria in all cases, sometimes as a barrier to portability and sometimes simply adding to 
the complexity of the regulation. Our categorisations are organized on the basis of the relevance of these 
lengths of time to regulations in our country-pair cases.  
- In some cases the lengths of time relate directly to EU regulations (esp 883/2004), and in some cases these 
requirements are independent of EU regulation. 
 
4. Additional residency requirements 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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- In some cases – especially, of course, family benefits, but also assistance and even health insurance– additional 
residency requirements can establish significant conditions on access to benefits for mobile people (contributing to 
our sum of conditions for portability).  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
5. Length of employment contributions 
a. Very short (> 3 months) 
b. Short (3-5 months) 
c. Medium (6-11 months) 
d. Long (12mths-4 years) 
e. Permanent 
 
6. Employment contributions continuity (the period over which contributions might count) 
a. Continuous 
b. Discontinuous 
 
- For mobile people, it is not just the length of contributions to an insurance scheme which matters, but also the 
continuity of contributions - over what time period are, for example, migrants expected to make continuous 
contributions in order to generate entitlement? 
- As a result, length of contributions and continuity should be assessed jointly. 
- To give an example, if a person must make 12 months contributions over 2 years to establish entitlement to 
unemployment insurance (Germany), this is less of a barrier to portability for our Bulgarian migrants than the 
same length of contributions over 12 months. 
 
7. Threshold for paying contributions (as % average pre-tax earnings OR as % of minimum wage) 
a. None 
b. Low 
c. High 
d. Not applicable  
 
- This condition could be important in practice for our mobile EU citizens; its intrinsic significance is a bit harder 
to judge. We have included it on the grounds that we would expect our mobile EU citizens to be 
disproportionately in lower wage employment than their national citizen counterparts (but we have at the 
moment next to no evidence to suggest this is the case, due to lack of access to data in several country-pairs).  
- However, if it is the case, then a high threshold wage before you pay contributions will disproportionately 
affect our participants, because they are less likely to earn the required amount to make their contributions. 
- As we are missing a lot of the data on thresholds, our column here does not follow the conditions set out 
above. Once we have the monetary amounts, we can calculate these as % of average earnings, and as % of 
minimum wage (where available) and present this data. 
 
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 
8. Length of benefit entitlement 
 
a. Very short (> 3 months) 
b. Short (3-5 months) 
c. Medium (6-11 months) 
d. Long (12 mths-4 years) 
e. Permanent (5 years or more) 
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- For one-time migrants, if the time limit is very short, this may affect their position in relation to limits on 
‘recourse to public funds’, or even their right to reside in the country of migration. For circular migrants, 
additional specifications about previous receipt of benefit, and the implications of extensive mobility for 
benefit receipt, make this condition perhaps especially important. 
 
9. Additional procedural requirements 
 
a. High (3 or more requirements) 
b. Medium (2) 
c. Low (1) 
d. None 
 
- We identified 3 common procedural requirements, which vary by benefit type and by country-case pair. 
o Attendance at meetings/training/medical tests more than once a month. Equivalent to 2 
requirements, as we believe it is so significant for migrants. 
o Formal registration for a special number or card, involving an interview/attendance at special tax or 
social insurance office. (1 requirement) 
o Requirement to register as unemployed (even if not entitled to benefit) in order to receive another 
benefit. (1 requirement). 
 
10. Discretion 
 
a. Strong (highly discretionary) 
b. Weak (discretion limited) 
 
- Our best data on this comes from summaries data from Key Informants, as well as what is implied by what our 
AU/HU team called ‘grundsätzlichkeit’ –  the ‘in principle’, answer, which  leaves actual entitlement in specific 
cases uncertain, and therefore at the discretion of the decisionmaker.  
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